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The panel's approach in this case leads to the result that
regulating the taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of its own,
lives its entire life in California constitutes regulating "Commerce...
among the several States."'
Was United States v. Lopez a constitutional freak? Or did it
signify that the Commerce Clause still imposes some meaningful limits
2
on congressionalpower?
INTRODUCTION

The Roberts Court emerges at a critical juncture in the
development of Commerce Clause doctrine. While the Commerce
Clause doctrine implicates federalism and separation of powers,
concerns rooted in the earliest part of our constitutional history, the
arrival of a new Court presents an ideal opportunity to critically
assess existing doctrines and to develop new analytical paradigms. An
1.
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
2.
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
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analysis of Commerce Clause doctrine reveals that while the
Rehnquist Court successfully imposed substantive limits on the scope
of this important source of congressional power for the first time in
sixty years,3 that Court was far less successful in developing a
coherent normative theory that reconciled its new doctrinal
limitations with the traditional broad scope of the post-New Deal
Commerce Clause cases. 4 This Article's new game theoretical
approach achieves these objectives by offering a compelling normative
account of Commerce Clause doctrine and a framework for applying
the new methodology to actual cases.
In the confirmation hearings for both John Roberts and Samuel
Alito, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee Arlen Specter
expressed concern that the Supreme Court's new Commerce Clause
doctrine, first articulated in United States v. Lopez 5 and later applied
in United States v. Morrison,6 demonstrated disrespect for Congress
and for its factfinding processes. 7 In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a majority, struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
which had made it a federal crime to use or possess a gun within 1000
feet of a public school.8 The Lopez Court changed the longstanding test
governing the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause powers,

3.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1995 as exceeding the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power); see also
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (striking civil remedies provisions of the
Violence Against Women Act as exceeding the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power).
4.
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5-9 (2005) (sustaining the application of the
Controlled Substances Act against the California Compassionate Use Act, thus disallowing
physician prescribed medical marijuana as permitted under state law). For a critical analysis of
the four approaches offered in separate opinions to the Commerce Clause in Raich, see infra
Part I.
5.
514 U.S. at 567-68.
6.
529 U.S. at 617-19.
7.
See Confirmation Hearingon the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3 (2005)
[hereinafter Roberts Hearings] (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) ("When the Supreme Court of the United States struck down a portion of the
legislation to protect women against violence, the Court did so because of our 'method of
reasoning.' And the dissent noted that that had carried the implication of judicial competence,
and the inverse of that is congressional incompetence."); Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of Samuel Alito to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearings]
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("In declaring
unconstitutional legislation designed to protect women against violence, the Supreme Court did
so notwithstanding a voluminous record in support of that legislation, but because of Congress'
'method of reasoning,' rather insulting to suggest that there is some superior method of
reasoning in the court.").
8.
514 U.S. at 552.
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attributable to the infamous case Wickard v. Filburn.9 While prior
cases had used "economic" to qualify the effects that the underlying
regulated activity had on commerce, 10 the new Commerce Clause
doctrine used "economic" to qualify the activity itself.1'
The Commerce Clause has long been a source of contention
between liberal and conservative jurists in large part because the
commerce power is broader in reach than virtually any other
Amendment
Tenth
The
power.12
congressional
delegated
13
congressional regulation under the Commerce
notwithstanding,
Clause has highlighted the tension between a model of limited and
delegated federal powers on the one hand and presumed or plenary
police state powers on the other. Using the newly devised noneconomic activities test, Rehnquist was able to cabin longstanding and
expansive Commerce Clause cases into a neatly defined, and
seemingly limited, category, 14 thus restoring at least the appearance
of limited congressional regulatory powers.
By devising a new Commerce Clause doctrine in the important
"substantial effects" category, the Lopez Court was able, for the first
time in over sixty years, to strike down an exercise of congressional
Commerce Clause power based upon the subject matter of the
underlying regulation. Most importantly, it did so while claiming to
reconcile Wickard, widely regarded as the Supreme Court's most far
reaching Commerce Clause case. 15 Five years later, in United States v.
Morrison,16 the Court struck down the civil remedies provision for

317 U.S. 111 (1942).
9.
10. See id. at 125 ("But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce .. ").
11. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 ("Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.").
12. For a debate on the proper scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power, compare id. at
584 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that taking the logic of the substantial effects cases to its
logical extreme would result in conferring police powers, rather than limited delegated powers,
upon Congress), with id. at 615, 631 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's restrictive
understanding of Congress's Commerce Clause powers and producing an Appendix that lists a
broad range of federal statutes potentially affected by the newly articulated non-economic
activities test).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ('The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
14. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60 (claiming that the articulated test includes even the most
expansive Supreme Court precedents sustaining Congress's Commerce Clause power).
15. See id. at 560 ("Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the
possession of a gun in a school zone does not.").
16. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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violent gender-related crimes in the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA"), 17 as exceeding the permissible scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers.1 8 While many viewed Lopez as symbolicthe opinion itself suggested that including a jurisdictional provision
linking the relevant gun to commerce might satisfy the new test 19Morrison demonstrated that more was at stake. No simple
jurisdictional fix could remedy the claimed difficulty that VAWA's civil
remedies provisions appeared to render a traditional matter of state
20
criminal law the basis for a new federal civil damages action.
The Supreme Court's most recent Commerce Clause case,
Gonzales v. Raich,21 which sustained a seemingly far reaching exercise
of congressional Commerce Clause power in the substantial effects
category, 22 further demonstrated that the Lopez Court's seemingly

17. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
18. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. For a description of the Morrison facts, see infra note 304.
19. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 ("Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce.").
20. For a more detailed discussion of Morrison, see infra Part III.B.3.
21. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Since Raich, the Supreme Court decided Rapanos v. United States, a
case in which it reversed and remanded a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit broadly construing the term "navigable waters" and "waters of the United States"
under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2235 (2006). The Sixth Circuit had
sustained a decision by the Army Corps of Engineers construing those terms to prevent the
filling of wetlands located a substantial distance from and with apparently tenuous connections
to traditional waters of the United States. Id. at 2219. While Rapanos implicated the Commerce
Clause, the case was ultimately resolved on statutory grounds, thus providing limited insight
into the Roberts Court's approach to the new Commerce Clause doctrine. Id. at 2235. The
Rapanos case generated a set of fractured panel opinions in which Justice Kennedy's concurrence
in the judgment, which no one else joined, stated the holding under the narrowest grounds
doctrine. See id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 2235 (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(discussing application of Marks doctrine to Rapanos (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188 (1977))). Justice Scalia produced a broader plurality opinion, which the new Chief Justice
and Associate Justices Alito and Thomas joined, in which he offered a narrow construction of the
relevant provisions of the CWA, claiming that under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, his
reading was necessary to avoid a conflict with the limits on congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause. See id. at 2224. Scalia maintained that for the Corps to exercise jurisdiction
over wetlands under the CWA, two conditions must be met: "First .... the adjacent channel
[must] contain a 'water of the United States,' (i.e. a relatively permanent body of water
connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and second,... the wetland [must have] a
continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the 'water'
ends and the 'wetland' begins." Id. at 2227. A majority of the Rapanos Court, including Justice
Kennedy, id. at 2246, and four dissenters, id. at 2261 (Stevens, J., dissenting), rejected the
plurality test, claiming that it was inconsistent with the statute's wording and with governing
precedent, and that the alternative broader readings of the statute that they offered posed no
Commerce Clause difficulty. For a more detailed discussion, see infra notes 223-38 and
accompanying text.
22. Chief Justice Rehnquist demonstrated, for example, that he did not intend his newly
articulated non-economic activities test to condone a congressional ban on state-approved,
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modest change in doctrinal formulation may have produced an
important, if unintended, consequence. In Raich, the Supreme Court
sustained an application of the federal Controlled Substances Act of
1970 ("CSA") to ban the cultivation, acquisition, and use of medical
marijuana, with a physician's prescription, as permitted under the
California Compassionate Use Act. 23 For the Raich majority, the
justification grew out of a straightforward application of the newly
minted substantial effects test. "Economics," now used to modify the
activities Congress can regulate, rather than the relationship between
the regulated activity and commerce, includes the study of production,
and the CSA ban regulated, among other activities, the production of
24
marijuana.
While Rehnquist had employed the non-economic activities test
to impose new limits on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
power, Justice Stevens, writing for the Raich majority, applied the
test in a manner that was more obviously intended to restore the
doctrine's earlier breadth. 25 The Raich Court set out to restore
Wickard v. Filburn,2 6 the centerpiece of the post-New Deal Court's
expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence, notwithstanding that at
least nominally, under Lopez and Morrison, Wickard remained good
27
law.
The Wickard Court sustained the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938, which allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to set production
quotas on wheat during an international wheat glut in an effort to
bolster prices, as applied to Filburn, a small farmer who exceeded his
modest wheat allotment. 28 In an excessively quoted portion of his
opinion for the unanimous Wickard Court, Justice Robert Jackson

physician-prescribed medical marijuana, by joining the principal dissent in Raich, 545 U.S. at 42
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23. See id. at 9 (majority opinion) ("The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as
applied to the troubling facts of this case.").
24. See id. at 25-26 (noting that '[e]conomics' refers to 'the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities,' " and sustaining application of CSA to Respondents' activities on
the ground that "[t]he CSA... regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market").
25. Justice Stevens was joined by the liberal Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and by
the centrist conservative Justice Kennedy. Id. at 5. Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence
in the judgment. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
26. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27. While Lopez did not overturn Wickard, as stated above, it did alter the wording of the
Wickard substantial effects test. See supra notes 10, 11, and 15, and accompanying text.
28. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118. For a discussion of how Filburn used the excess wheat,
see infra note 101, and accompanying text.
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explained, in essence, that while Filburn's activity was entirely local,
29
if everybody engaged in it, the activity would then become national.
While jurists and scholars have ridiculed Wickard, claiming
that it has no stopping point, 30 read in context, Justice Jackson's
argument was substantially more measured. 3' Fairly read, Jackson's
opinion demonstrates that federal regulatory intervention was
necessary to solve a peculiar coordination problem associated with
wheat production: Rational farmers, and states, could be expected to
undermine any agreed upon beneficial pricing scheme intended to
extricate growers from the difficulties associated with the
international wheat glut.
The Raich Court did not offer any satisfactory theory that
reconciled the post-New Deal Commerce Clause expansion with the
more recent doctrinal retrenchments represented by Lopez and
Morrison. Rather than inquiring whether a coordination difficulty
similar to that in Wickard or other post-New Deal cases appeared on
the facts of Raich that would justify imposing a federal regulatory ban
on state-sanctioned medical marijuana, Justice Stevens instead
applied the literal definition of "economics" to find that the growth and
32
distribution of marijuana qualifies as a regulable market activity.
Ironically, under this reading of Lopez, the act of production, which in
an earlier and more formalistic generation of Commerce Clause cases
represented the principal limitation on the scope of Congress's
Commerce power, 33 suddenly provides an independent basis for
congressional regulatory authority.
The discussions about the Commerce Clause in the two most
recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearings were no more successful
in suggesting a coherent framework for applying the new Commerce
Clause doctrine. John Roberts assured Senator Specter that the
federal judiciary was obligated to respect Congress and its factfinding
processes. 34 At the same time, however, Roberts defended his dissent

29. See id. at 127-28 (asserting "[t]hat appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where,
as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial").
30. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(claiming that "[t]he aggregation principle is clever, but has no stopping point," and that the
principle could be used to justify regulation of "every aspect of human existence").
31. For a more detailed discussion of Wickard, see infra Part II.A.
32. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2005).
33. For a more detailed discussion, wifh citations, see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
34. Roberts Hearings, supra note 7, at 300 (statement of Judge Roberts responding to
Senator Specter) ("[Wlith respect to review of congressional findings ... my view of the
appropriate role of a judge is a limited role and that you do not make the law .... ").
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from the denial of rehearing en banc in Rancho Viejo, LLC v.
Norton35-a case in which a panel rejected a constitutional challenge
to applying the Endangered Species Act to prevent a planned
development that threatened the arroyo toad, a listed endangered
species endemic to California 36-as
a modest judicial attempt to
search for an alternative, less problematic ground with which to
sustain the federal regulation. 37 Similarly, while Samuel Alito flatly
rejected the suggestion that federal jurists exhibit superior reasoning
to members of Congress, 38 he defended his dissent in United States v.
Rybar,39 a case that sustained a conviction for possession and
distribution of machine guns, on the ground that the statute failed to
include a simple jurisdictional provision linking the gun to interstate
40
commerce.
Current Supreme Court case law and the recent Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings clearly demonstrate the need for
critical new thinking on the Commerce Clause. 41 Using basic insights
35. 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
36. See id. at 1065, 1080.
37. Roberts also explained in both his dissent and in the hearings that the case was
problematic in that the panel had at least implicitly sustained the regulation on the ground that
the overall regulatory scheme, rather than the regulated activity itself, substantially affected
commerce. See Roberts Hearings, supra note 7, at 226 (statement of Judge John Roberts in
response to question by Sen. Feinstein). Then-Judge Roberts said:
Well, the opinion I wrote there noted that the panel decision that I thought
should be reheard en banc looked at one ground ... under the Commerce
Clause and the concluding paragraph in my opinion said that we ought to
rehear the case to look at other grounds that were also under the Commerce
Clause, but they were not the particular prong of the Commerce Clause
analysis that the panel opinion had relied on ....
Id.; see also Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the "panel's opinion in effect asks
whether the challenged regulation substantially affects interstate commerce, rather than
whether the activity being regulated does so," possibly creating conflict among Circuits and with
the Supreme Court (emphasis in original)). For an analysis that compares this to Justice Scalia's
analysis in Raich, see infra note 123 and accompanying text, and for a more detailed analysis of
Rancho Viejo, see infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
38. Alito Hearings, supra note 7, at 476 (statement of Judge Samuel Alito responding to
questioning by Sen. Spector) ("I would never suggest that judges have superior reasoning power
than does Congress.").
39. 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
40. Cf. id. at 285 (majority opinion) (finding that the inclusion of a jurisdictional element is
not a necessary condition for validity under the Commerce Clause). Of course including such a
provision would move both Rybar and Lopez from the difficult "substantial effects" category of
Congress's commerce power to the far less controversial category involving the regulation of
persons or things traveling in interstate commerce. See infra Part III.A (discussing case
category).
41. Notably, one paper symposium was dedicated to the Supreme Court's most recent
decision, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). See Symposium, Federalism After Gonzales v.
Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743, 743-934 (2005) (paper symposium with contributions by
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from game theory, this Article fills this void by offering a new
analytical framework that reconciles two sets of insights that remain
in tension. First, the post-New Deal Commerce Clause doctrine
reveals the inherent difficulties in limiting the scope of federal
Commerce Clause powers based upon simple tests that demarcate the
proper allocation of authority between the states and the federal
government. Second, the new Commerce Clause doctrine reflects the
concern that, taken to its logical extreme, Wickard's multiplier
analysis risks transforming the Commerce Clause from a specific, if
broad, delegation of power to Congress, into the equivalent of plenary
police powers operating on a national scale. While this Article offers a
means of reconciling the expansive post-New Deal Commerce Clause
cases with Lopez and Morrison, its goals are appreciably more
ambitious. This Article articulates a compelling normative account of
Commerce Clause doctrine-one that grounds the doctrine in the need
for federal regulation to resolve coordination problems that prevent
states from furthering desired regulatory objectives on their own-and
offers a framework for implementing that normative policy in actual
cases.
To present the Commerce Clause doctrine, this Article begins
with Raich, not only because it is the most recent Supreme Court
decision, 42 but also because it provides four separate opinions, each
offering an alternative method of framing Commerce Clause doctrine
in the critical substantial effects category. The Raich opinions also
provide a ready means through which to present the most important
Supreme Court cases, including most notably Wickard, Lopez, and
Morrison. The discussion will demonstrate that while the Court lacks
a coherent normative theory governing the scope of Congress's
Randy Barnett, Jonathan H. Adler, Ann Althouse, Eric R. Claeys, Thomas W. Merrill, John T.
Parry, Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Glenn H. Reynolds, and Brannon P. Denning). While the
contributors offer important insights into Commerce Clause doctrine, including critical
assessments of Raich, none offers a comprehensive scheme drawing upon tools of game theory to
reconcile the ambitious post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases with the more recent
retrenchments represented in Lopez and Morrison.
42. While the Court might have used Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), to offer
further guidance on the permissible scope of congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause, the Court instead limited its holding, that the Controlled Substances Act did not
authorize Attorney General John Ashcroft to interpret the Act to ban physician-assisted suicide
in contravention of an Oregon law permitting it, to an application of the agency deference rules
established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), and United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 915-17
(applying Chevron and Mead to hold that under the CSA, the Attorney General "is not
authorized to make a rule declaring illegitimate a medical standard for care and treatment of
patients that is specifically authorized under state law"); accord Ilya Somin, A False Dawn for
Federalism: Clear Statements Rules After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005-2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 113,
124 ("Oregon does not in any way undercut Raich's constitutional holding.").
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Commerce Clause powers, a majority of the Rehnquist Court that
appears likely to have carried over to the Roberts Court is committed
to continuing the Lopez project while also maintaining the major postNew Deal Commerce Clause cases. To reconcile these intuitions, this
Article will rely upon two simple coordination games: the prisoners'
dilemma and the multiple Nash equilibrium bargaining game.
The prisoners' dilemma analysis will show the circumstances in
which, absent federal regulatory intervention, individual firms or
states are motivated to thwart the objectives of three identified federal
policies: first, centrally coordinated pricing schemes; second, centrally
regulated working conditions; and third, centrally coordinated
environmental regulations. 43 The multiple Nash equilibrium game will
establish a fourth category, which arises when individual states are
rationally motivated to undermine a desired policy that promotes
geographical coordination among states.
These two game theoretical models, and the four doctrinal
categories that they create, are sufficiently broad to encompass most
of the major post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases, not limited to the
substantial effects cases. 44 The models also reconcile current doctrine
by demonstrating the absence of any needed federal regulatory
coordination in the Lopez and Morrison cases. While this Article thus
reconciles the pre-Raich Commerce Clause cases, it offers a critical
assessment of Raich itself. The analysis demonstrates the absence of
any coordination difficulty justifying the application of the CSA to ban
California from facilitating physician prescribed medical marijuana.
Even if readers disagree with this Article's ultimate conclusion that
Raich represents an improper application of congressional Commerce
Clause power, however, that is secondary to this Article's larger
mission, namely to offer a compelling normative theory of the
Commerce Clause and to set out a comprehensive framework for
applying that theory to actual cases.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the four
opinions in Gonzales v. Raich and places them in their proper
doctrinal context. Part II presents two simple game theoretical models
that together develop four doctrinal categories. Identifying these

43. I do not suggest that additional coordination games beyond those listed, which are
suggested in the case law, might not arise. This Article is not intended to provide an exhaustive
list, but rather a flexible, yet comprehensive framework for analysis that allows for the inclusion
of additional coordination games identified in future Commerce Clause cases.
44. As explained infra Part III.B.4.a, while the analysis makes Wickard an easy case
justifying the use of congressional Commerce Clause power, it raises the question whether the
Supreme Court correctly sustained Congress's exercise of Commerce Clause power in Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146-57 (1971).
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categories proves essential to assessing the proper scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause power. While Part II presents specific cases that
help to develop the models, Part III applies the framework developed
in Part II to several additional cases including Raich. The Article
closes with some comments on the future scope of Commerce Clause
power.

I.

THE RAICH OPINIONS IN CONTEXT

In Gonzales v. Raich,4 5 the federal Controlled Substances Act,46
which prohibited all marijuana use except as part of a research project
approved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), 47 conflicted
with the California Compassionate Use Act ("CCUA"). 48 Under
specified conditions, the CCUA protected patients who suffered
specified ailments, others for whom marijuana provides relief,49 and
their prescribing physicians, from prosecution for the cultivation,
50
possession, and use of medical marijuana.
Respondents Angel Raich and Diane Monson were California
residents who suffered serious illnesses and who, as a result of the
failure of traditional medicines and the success of medical marijuana
in treating their symptoms, qualified for eligibility under the CCUA.
Both Raich and Monson had used marijuana under medical
supervision "to function on a daily basis." 51 Raich's physician had
submitted an affidavit attesting that he "believe[d] that forgoing
cannabis treatments would... cause Raich excruciating pain and
'52
could very well prove fatal.
45. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
46. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000). The CSA, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 100, 84 Stat. 1242, is
contained in Title II of The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. See
Raich, 545 U.S. at 12 & n.19.
47. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 14 ("By classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, as opposed to
listing it on a lesser schedule, the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana became
a criminal offense, with the sole exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug
Administration pre-approved research study.").
48. This Act was originally passed by California voters as Proposition 215 in 1996. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5 (West 2005); Raich, 545 U.S. at 5.
49. Among the listed ailments for which medical marijuana is deemed appropriate are
"cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other
illness for which marijuana provides relief." Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 n.4 (quoting the Compassionate
Use Act, now codified as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5).
50. Justice Stevens explained, "The proposition was designed to ensure that 'seriously ill'
residents of the State have access to marijuana for medical purposes, and to encourage Federal
and State Governments to take steps towards ensuring the safe and affordable distribution of
the drug to patients in need." Id. at 5-6.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id.
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While "Monson cultivate[d] her own marijuana," Raich instead
"relie[d] on two caregivers, litigating as 'John Does,' [who] provided
her with locally grown marijuana at no charge." 53 In August 2002,
county sheriffs and agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") found marijuana in Monson's home. 54 Although California law
authorized her use of the marijuana, the federal agents nonetheless
55
seized and destroyed her six cannabis plants.
A. Lower Court Proceedings
Respondents brought suit against the Attorney General of the
United States and the head of the DEA, seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief prohibiting enforcement of the CSA inasmuch as it
prevented them "from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing
cannabis for their personal medical use."56 While respondents raised a
number of constitutional claims, 57 based upon the disposition in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Raich Court
focused exclusively on whether, as applied to respondents' activities,
the absolute federal ban on marijuana was a proper constitutional
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers.
The district court, which denied respondents' motion for
preliminary injunction, determined that although the federal interest
in a complete ban on medical marijuana "waned" in comparison with
the harm to respondents if their access were discontinued,
respondents nonetheless could not "demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits."5 8 The Ninth Circuit, which reversed and
ordered the district court to issue a preliminary injunction, split on
whether the controlling line of Supreme Court precedent was the
recent retrenchment in Commerce Clause powers set out in United
States v. Lopez 59 and United States v. Morrison,60 or instead, the
expansive body of post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases, including

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Respondents presented claims under the Commerce Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and the doctrine of medical necessity. Id. at
8.
58. Id.
59. See 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds
Congress's Commerce Clause powers).
60. See 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (holding that the civil remedies provisions of the
Violence Against Women Act exceed Congress's Commerce Clause powers).
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most notably Wickard v. Filburn.61 The majority determined that
recent Ninth Circuit precedent construing Lopez and Morrison had
placed medical marijuana as a "separate class of purely local activity
beyond the reach of federal power." 62 In contrast, the dissent
determined that it was "simply impossible to distinguish the relevant
conduct surrounding the cultivation and use of the marijuana crop at
issue in this case from the cultivation and use of the wheat crop that
affected interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn."63 The Supreme
64
Court granted certiorari.
B. Justice Stevens'Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens defined the central issue in Raich as whether
"Congress's power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal
substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are
supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally." 65 While
expressing sympathy for the respondents and acknowledging the
troubling facts, Stevens ultimately concluded that, as applied to
respondents' activities, "[w]ell-settled law" demonstrates that "[t]he
66
CSA is a valid exercise of federal power."
Stevens explained that the CSA was enacted as part of
President Nixon's first campaign in the "war on drugs."6 7 Through the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
("Comprehensive Drug Act"), 68 Congress consolidated various drug
laws into a single statute and reorganized federal drug law
administration. 69 The Comprehensive Drug Act also accomplished two
further objectives. First, it limited diversion of drugs to illegal

61. See 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (holding that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
as applied to a local farmer producing wheat above allotted quota does not exceed Congress's
Commerce Clause powers).
62. Raich, 545 U.S. at 9.
63. Id. (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2003) (Beam, J.,
dissenting)).
64. This case was not only important to California, but also to at least eight other states,
which had enacted similar compassionate use laws governing medical marijuana. See id. at 5.
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 10.
68. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). Stevens also described prior congressional
efforts to regulate the national market for illicit drugs prior to the 1970 reforms. See Raich, 545
U.S. at 10 (describing the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 and the Harrison Narcotics Act of
1914).

69. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 10-11 (describing the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 as a response to the perceived need to consolidate the various drug laws and
enhance federal enforcement powers).
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channels by regulating their legitimate sources. Second, it
70
strengthened law enforcement against illegal drug trafficking.
The CSA, which contains the marijuana prohibition at issue in
Raich, forms Title II of the Act. Title II establishes a comprehensive
regime to fight domestic and international drug trafficking by
controlling both the legitimate and illegitimate market in controlled
substances. 71 Justice Stevens explained that one of the principal
objectives of Title II was preventing the diversion of drugs from legal
72
to illegal channels.
To accomplish this objective, Congress developed a closed
regulatory system making it illegal to "manufacture, distribute,
dispense, or possess any controlled substances," other than as
authorized by the CSA. 73 The CSA established five schedules for drugs
based upon "their accepted medical uses, the potential for abuse, and
their psychological and physical effects on the body." 74 Each schedule
contains a distinct set of regulatory controls governing the
manufacture, distribution, and uses of the drugs. Marijuana is
included in Schedule I, which contains the most stringent regulations,
including making "the manufacture, distribution, or possession of
marijuana.., a criminal offense, with the sole exception being use of
the drug as part of a Food and Drug Administration pre-approved
75
research study."

70. For Justice Stevens' discussion of earlier federal marijuana regulation, see id. at 11
(describing the Marihuana Tax Act).
71. Id. at 12.
72. Justice Stevens noted that Congress had made the following findings to support the
CSA:
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be
differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed
interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between
controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled
substances manufactured and distributed intrastate.
(6) Federal Control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled
substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of
such traffic.
Id. at 13 n.20 (quoting 21 U.S.C. §§ 801(1)-(6) (2006)).
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 14. Stevens explained that while the CSA delegates authority to the Attorney
General, after consulting with the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), to move
drugs between the five schedules, the considerable efforts by the National Organization for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws ("NORML') to change marijuana from Schedule I have generally
failed. Id. at 14-15 & n.23. Stevens identified a single exception, which involved a 1988 decision
of an Administrative Law Judge concluding that it would be "unreasonable, arbitrary, and
capricious" to continue denying marijuana to seriously ill patients. Id. at 15 n.23. The DEA
declined to endorse this opinion, and all prior and subsequent efforts at reclassification,
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Justice Stevens observed that respondents did not challenge
the passage of the CSA as part of the larger overhaul of drug laws set
out in the Act, and that they did not contend that any provision or
76
section of the CSA exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause powers.
Instead, Stevens explained, respondents presented the following,
narrower claim: "IT]he CSA's categorical prohibition of the
manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate
manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes
pursuant to California law exceeds Congress's authority under the
77
Commerce Clause."
1. Justice Stevens' Doctrinal Analysis
While Justice Stevens stressed the importance of reading the
Commerce Clause cases in their proper context, his historical analysis
of the Commerce Clause doctrine was notably thin. 78 Stevens
explained that the Commerce Clause was enacted in response to the
Framers' perception that the absence of federal commerce power had
proved problematic under the Articles of Confederation. 79 He added
that for the first century, the Commerce Clause was primarily
employed judicially against state laws that discriminated in
commerce.8 0 Stevens then observed that Congress began relying upon
the Commerce Clause at the end of the Nineteenth Century, during
the era of industrialization, in an effort to regulate the "increasingly
81
interdependent national economy."
Whereas constitutional scholars generally recognize several
changing historical periods in the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, 2 Justice Stevens instead presented the resulting
doctrine as comprising a single " 'new era,' which now spans more
than a century."8 3 Stevens thus treated different doctrinal periods as
including five petitions for reclassification over thirty years in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, have failed. Id.
76. Id. at 15.
77. Id.
78. In fact, Stevens's historical summary consisted of three paragraphs. See id. at 15-16
(describing the evolution of the Commerce Clause from 1937 to 2006).
79. Id. at 16.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-215
(15th ed. 2004) (dividing Commerce Clause jurisprudence into (1) The Interpretation of the
Commerce Power from 1824 to 1936; (2) The Decline of Limits on the Commerce Power from
1937 to 1995; (3) New Limits on Commerce Power Since 1995; and (4) External Limits on the
Commerce Power: State Autonomy, Federalism and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments).
83. Raich, 545 U.S. at 16.
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continuous, and in so doing ascribed the Lopez Court's revised
doctrinal formulation of the substantial effects category to cases from
an earlier period.8 4 This is important because the revised Lopez
formulation, rather than the formulation that it replaced, proved
essential to Stevens' ultimate determination that wheat, per Wickard,
and medical marijuana, per Raich, warranted like treatment under
the Commerce Clause.
2. Lopez, Morrison, and the Doctrinal Transformation from "Economic
Effects" to "Economic Activities"
Justice Stevens listed the permissible Commerce Clause
categories recognized in Lopez8 5 and reiterated in Morrison.8 6 In
addition to the power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce,
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things
traveling in interstate commerce, categories not implicated in Wickard
or Raich, Justice Stevens observed that longstanding case law
afforded Congress the power to regulate "activities that substantially
87
affect interstate commerce."
While Stevens initially presented the test articulated in such
cases as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.8 8 and Perez v. United
States, 9 he proceeded to reformulate this test, consistently with
Lopez, without identifying the source of modification or even
mentioning the doctrinal change. Justice Stevens stated: "Our case
law firmly establishes Congress's power to regulate purely local
activities that are part of an economic 'class of activities' that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce." 90 Because this doctrinal

84. Specifically, Stevens ascribed the "economic 'class of activities' " test from the
substantial effects category to Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1970), and to Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942), when neither case employed that test. See Raich, 545 U.S.
at 11 n.17. Instead, Perez quoted the famous Wickard formulation. 402 U.S. at 151-52 (quoting
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125); see also supra note 10 (citing Wickard).
85. 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
86. 529 U.S. 589, 609 (2000); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 16-17 (explaining there are three
categories of authorized regulation: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of
interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce).
87. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.
88. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) ("activities that substantially affect interstate commerce").
89. 402 U.S. at 150 ("activities affecting commerce").
90. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. Curiously, Justice Stevens went on to quote the Wickard
formulation: "[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce." Id. And yet, while claiming to apply Wickard, Stevens
instead rested his analysis on the critical reformulation in Lopez. Id. at 24.
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transformation is critical to the analysis that follows, it is important to
briefly consider its origins.
Other commentators have commented on, and criticized,
Rehnquist's doctrinal transformation in Lopez from inquiring into
whether the regulated activity has a substantial economic effect on
commerce to whether the activity itself is economic. 91 In one line of
pre-Lopez Commerce Clause cases, the Supreme Court had based the
scope of Congress's regulatory power on whether the underlying
activity was characterized as "economic. '92 These cases provide little
support for the use of a non-economic activities test in Lopez, however,
because they involved the question of whether Congress can regulate
states acting as employers or as service providers in the same manner
that Congress regulates private actors. 93 In the statutes at issue in
Wickard and Raich, in contrast, Congress was not regulating states or
other units of government. Rather, Congress was regulating private
individuals. Instead of relying upon this line of cases for the new noneconomic activities test, Rehnquist cited Heart of Atlanta Hotel v.

91.

Justice Breyer, dissenting in Lopez, observed:
Moreover, the majority's test is not consistent with what the Court saw as the
point of the cases that the majority now characterizes. Although the majority
today attempts to categorize Perez, McClung, and Wickard as involving
intrastate "economic activity," the Courts that decided each of those cases did
not focus upon the economic nature of the activity regulated. Rather, they
focused upon whether that activity affected interstate or foreign commerce.
In fact, the Wickard Court expressly held that Filburn's consumption of
homegrown wheat, "though it may not be regarded as commerce," could
nevertheless be regulated--"whatever its nature"-so long as "it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 628 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(internal citation omitted). For academic commentaries on this doctrinal formulation, see, e.g.,
Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, UnidimensionalFederalism:Power and Perspective in
Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1222 (2003); Adrienne J. Vaughan,
The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act as Litigated in United States v.
Morrison: The Supreme Court's Sacrificial Lamb to Reinforce United States v. Lopez, 24
HAMLINE L. REV. 163, 166 (2000).
92. Prior critics of Lopez have not focused on the use of economic activities in this group of
Commerce Clause cases.
93. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the
Supreme Court upheld the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), Pub. L.
No. 75-718, § 13, 52 Stat. 1060, 1067, to the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
("SAMTA"), stating that even though SAMTA's activities "might well be characterized as
local.., it has long been settled that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to
intrastate economic activities that affect interstate commerce." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537. In
formulating the economic activities test, the Garcia Court relied upon Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183 (1968), which sustained the application of FLSA to state schools and hospitals, stating:
"If a State is engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal
Government when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its
activities to federal regulation." Id. at 197.
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United States,94 Katzenbach v. McClung,95 and Wickard,96 cases in
which Congress regulated private actors and in which the Supreme
Court had applied the traditional substantial effects test without
97
inquiring into the nature of the regulated activity.
3. The Wickard Connection
While Stevens suggested that the Wickard Court sustained
Congress's regulation of wheat production as a quintessential
economic activity, a careful reading of the case demonstrates
otherwise. Indeed, Wickard rejected the very formalist analysis that in
an earlier period invalidated the regulation of production, including
minimum wages and maximum hours in manufacturing, on the
ground that it was an activity that preceded commerce, and thus fell
within the protected sphere of reserved state powers. 98 Instead,
Wickard sustained Congress's regulation of wheat production because
of the effect that allowing such production without regulation would
have had on the regulated interstate wheat market.
Justice Stevens explained that the Wickard Court considered
the Adjustment Act of 1938's impact upon Filburn. The Adjustment
Act was intended to bolster the price of wheat amid a glut by limiting
the volume of wheat produced. 99 Filburn had been allotted 11.1 acres
for his 1941 wheat crop, but sowed twenty-three acres instead. 10 0
Filburn maintained that he used the excess entirely on his own
farm. 101
94. 379 U.S. 241, 269 (1964).
95. 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964).
96. 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
97. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995). While Rehnquist reformulated
the substantial activities test to limit Congress's lawmaking power in the expansive substantial
effects category, as explained in the next part, see infra Part III, the doctrinal transformation
was not necessary to the holdings in Lopez or Morrison.
98. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) ("Commerce succeeds to
manufacture, and is not a part of it."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1824)
("[Inspection laws.., act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of
commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose.").
99. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (1995) (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118).
100. Id.
101. Id. Although Justice Stevens makes this assertion in Raich when characterizing
Wickard, in the majority opinion for Wickard, Justice Jackson states: "The intended disposition
of the crop here involved has not been expressly stated." 317 U.S. at 114. Nevertheless,
numerous academic commentators have characterized Wickard as Justice Stevens did in Raich.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address at the Willamette Law Review Symposium:
Laboratories of Democracy: Federalism and State Law Independency (Mar. 11, 2005), in 41
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 827, 830 (2005) ("A farmer [in Wickard] challenged the law and said that
what he grew for his family to eat didn't have any effect on interstate commerce."); Barry
Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089,
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Justice Stevens quoted the following excerpt from Justice
Jackson's famous decision rejecting Filburn's argument that the
penalty for violating his wheat quota exceeded Congress's Commerce
Clause powers:
The effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be produced for
market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by
producing to meet his own needs. That appellee's own contribution to the demand for
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
taken together with that of many others
regulation where, as here, his contribution,
10 2
similarly situated, is far from trivial.

After noting several factual similarities between Raich and
Wickard,10 3 Justice Stevens explained:
In Wickard, we had no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for
believing that, when viewed in the aggregate, leaving home-consumed wheat outside the
regulatory scheme would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions.
Here too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed
marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions. 104

Justice Stevens explained that, as in Wickard, where the Court
recognized Congress's concern that enforcing production quotas was
necessary to protect rising market prices given that wheat intended
for home consumption competed with wheat in commerce, in Raich,
Congress had expressed a parallel concern that the high demand for
illicit marijuana would draw into the market home-grown marijuana
intended for medical use. 10 5 One difficulty with Stevens's analysis,
however, is that the issue in Raich was not whether Congress could
limit the market in marijuana as an illegal drug. Instead, it was
whether, given the local nature of respondents' activities and the use
of state police powers to regulate it, Congress had a rational basis for
1138 (2000) ("Filburn had marketed the harvest from his allotted acreage, but rather than
storing the excess as prescribed, he had reserved all of his surplus wheat for use and
consumption on his own farm."). A possible source of this confusion is a sentence in the Wickard
opinion that says: "It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as homeconsumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions." 317 U.S. at
128 (emphasis added).
102. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28).
103. Justice Stevens explained:
Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home
consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit
illegal, interstate market. Just as the Agricultural Adjustment Act was
designed "to control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign
commerce in order to avoid surpluses..." and consequently control the
market price,... a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and
demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets.
Id. at 18-19 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
104. Id. at 19. To support this argument, Stevens noted that respondents had themselves
participated in the illegal marijuana market. See id. at 18 n.28.
105. Id. at 19.
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believing that the federal scheme would be undermined if it did not
also ban the more narrowly targeted class of state-sanctioned medical
marijuana. In analogizing wheat and marijuana, Justice Stevens
assumed Congress's power to impose a complete ban, when that was
10 6
the issue presented in the case.
Justice Stevens explained that in applying the substantial
effects test, the Court inquires only whether Congress had a rational
basis for having found a substantial effect. Given the difficulty in
assessing the origin of marijuana and in preventing diversion from
legal to illicit channels, as applied to the CSA's complete ban, Stevens
concluded that the scheme's justification was not merely rational, but
10 7
was "visible to the naked eye."'
Like Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment, 0 8 Justice
Stevens maintained that the Necessary and Proper Clause
demonstrates that Congress had a rational basis in linking even local
use of marijuana to interstate commerce. Stevens stated:
[As] in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate
market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper to regulate Commerce ... among the
several States .... That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no
many times before, we refuse to excise individual components
moment. As we have done
09
of that larger scheme. 1

Justice Stevens rejected the Ninth Circuit's reliance upon
Lopez and Morrison in striking down the absolute marijuana ban.
Stevens explained that while those cases involved challenges to
isolated federal regulatory schemes, the Raich respondents were
106. Thus, Stevens stated:
While the diversion of homegrown wheat tended to frustrate the federal
interest in stabilizing prices by regulating the volume of commercial
transactions in the interstate market, the diversion of homegrown marijuana
tends to frustrate the federal interest in eliminating commercial transactions
in the interstate market in their entirety.
Id. As Justice Thomas observed in dissent, this part of Stevens's argument is circular. The
federal interest justifying the ban on medical marijuana is defined to include all transactions,
including those limited to physician-approved uses. If the federal interest had instead been
defined to prohibit illicit uses, permitting Congress to extend the ban to approved medical uses
would not necessarily further that federal interest. See id. at 68 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 28-29. Stevens further argued that limiting the activity to marijuana possession
and cultivation "in accordance with state law" cannot prevent congressional regulation because
the Supremacy Clause "unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and
state law, federal law must prevail." Id. at 29. This argument is also circular, see supra note 106,
since federal law only prevails under the Supremacy Clause when in pursuance of the
Constitution and laws of the United States. If the Court had determined instead that as applied
to respondents' activities, which were permitted under state law, the CSA was unconstitutional,
the Supremacy Clause would not apply.
108. See infra Part I.C.
109. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (internal quotations omitted).
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seeking to have the Court "excise individual applications of a
concededly valid statutory scheme." 110 Instead, Stevens relied upon
the revised Lopez/Morrison framework to pose the central question in
Raich as whether cultivating (or otherwise acquiring) and using
marijuana, even on the advice of a physician as permitted under state
law for a medical ailment, was "economic" activity and therefore
within Congress's power to proscribe under the Commerce Clause. To
answer this question, Stevens referred to the definition of "Economics"
set out in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, which
includes "the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities." ' Stevens concluded that respondents' activities, like
those of Mr. Filburn in Wickard, qualified as economic and were thus
within Congress's power to proscribe.
While conceding that respondents' narrow claim, seeking to
protect physician-prescribed
medical marijuana from federal
regulation as a "distinct class of activity," might justify different
legislative or administrative treatment, Stevens concluded that it did
not undermine Congress's constitutional exercise of lawmaking
power. 112 Instead, Stevens determined that the "personal medical
purposes on the advice of a physician" cannot distinguish respondents'
activities from other cultivation of marijuana banned by Schedule I of
the CSA because Congress found that marijuana has no legitimate
113
use.
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrencein the Judgment
In his separate opinion, Justice Scalia noted that while the
Court, since Perez v. United States,1 1 4 has "mechanically recited" three

110. Id. Thus, Stevens explained that the Court has repeatedly asserted that "where the
class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have
no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class." Id. at 23 (quoting Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
111. Id. at 25-26 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
As Justice Thomas noted in dissent, it is curious that Stevens relied upon a forty-year-old
dictionary to define economics. See id. at 69 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 26 (majority opinion) (noting the "differences between the members of a class
so defined and the principal traffickers in Schedule I substances might be sufficient to justify a
policy decision exempting the narrower class from the coverage of the CSA").
113. Id. Stevens conceded that the absolute ban on marijuana, through its continued
Schedule I listing, might run counter to current scientific evidence supporting a valid medical
use, but maintained that such arguments should be advanced to Congress, not to the Supreme
Court. See id. at 28 n.37 (citing studies and explaining they would, if accepted, "cast serious
doubt on the accuracy of the findings that require marijuana to be listed in Schedule I").
114. 402 U.S. 146.
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permissible Commerce Clause categories, the listing is misleading.1 1 5
Because "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are
not themselves part of interstate commerce," Scalia explained,
Congress's power to regulate them "cannot come from the Commerce
Clause alone."' 1 6 And yet, Congress sometimes finds it necessary and
proper to regulate interstate commerce by "eliminating potential
obstructions" or by "eliminating potential stimulants."'1 7 The resulting
power to regulate intra-state activities that are not themselves in
commerce is expansive, Scalia explained, but "not without
limitation."'" 8 Instead, the power to regulate in the substantial effects
cases is limited because the underlying activity must be "economic,"
and because the connection from the regulated activity to commerce
cannot result from "pil[ing] inference upon inference."" 9
Scalia maintained that, at least implicitly, Lopez recognized
Congress's power to enact laws necessary and proper to furthering its
commerce power even if the regulation was not "directed against
economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."' 20 Instead, in regulating interstate commerce, Congress
"possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective." 12'
While these two powers overlap, they are distinct. Scalia claimed that
122
in Raich, the distinction proved critical.
While Stevens, writing for the majority, distinguished Lopez
and Morrison on the ground that in those cases, Congress had
regulated non-economic activities, Scalia instead maintained that the
distinction was more subtle. Whether or not Lopez and Morrison
involved economic activity or activity with a substantial effect on
commerce, in contrast with the schemes at issue in Wickard and
Raich, neither case involved the regulation of local activity in a

115. Raich, 545 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
116. Id. at 34.
117. Id. at 35.
118. Id.

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942)).
This analysis helped Scalia to offer the following alternative reading of Wickard:
Because the unregulated production of wheat for personal consumption
diminished demand in the regulated wheat market, the Court said, it carried
with it the potential to disrupt Congress's price regulation by driving down
prices in the market. This potential disruption of Congress's interstate
regulation, and not only the effect that personal consumption of wheat had on
interstate commerce, justified Congress's regulation of that conduct.
Id. at 37 n.2 (citation omitted).
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manner that was necessary and proper123 in the furtherance of a
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme.
As applied to the CSA, Scalia claimed, the resulting analysis
was "straightforward."' 124 As part of its comprehensive regulatory
scheme, the CSA sought to eliminate altogether traffic in marijuana.
Even though the cultivation of marijuana itself might not qualify as
an economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce,
because marijuana is a fungible commodity it was necessary and
proper for Congress to ban it entirely in order to effectuate Congress's
12 5
larger regulatory scheme.
D. Justice O'Connor's PrincipalDissent
In the principal dissent, which the Chief Justice and Justice
Thomas joined, Justice O'Connor claimed that properly viewed, the
Raich facts exemplified the benefits of a scheme of horizontally
divided powers in which the states operated as experimental
laboratories. 126 O'Connor chided the majority for thwarting this role
and for producing "perverse incentive[s]" by allowing Congress to
regulate local non-economic activity provided it somehow linked the
regulation to a broader regulatory scheme. 12 7 O'Connor claimed that
the same arguments for rejecting the application of the Commerce

123. See id. at 39 (positing that "Lopez expressly disclaimed that it was such a case, and
Morrison did not even discuss the possibility that it was [such a case]" (citations omitted)).
Scalia's reasoning is at least potentially in tension with that of Justice Roberts, as expressed
both in Roberts's confirmation hearing, see supra note 37 and cites therein, and in Roberts's
dissent from the denial of the petition of rehearing en banc in Rancho Viejo, in which he
maintained that the difficulty in applying the Endangered Species Act was that the overall
regulatory scheme, but not the regulated activity itself, substantially affected interstate
commerce, see Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
124. Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
125. Scalia rejected the principal dissent's criticism that the majority analysis turns Lopez
into a drafting guide by letting Congress regulate local activity when linked to a comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme. Scalia argued instead that Congress's power to regulate local noneconomic activities remains limited because as a precondition, Congress must have in place a
comprehensive scheme regulating activity affecting interstate commerce, a requirement that he
claimed was absent in Lopez and Morrison. Id. at 38-39.
126. See id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 43. Justice O'Connor further wrote:
I did not understand our discussion of the role of courts in enforcing outer
limits of the Commerce Clause for the sake of maintaining the federalist
balance our Constitution requires ... as a signal to Congress to enact
legislation that is more extensive and more intrusive into the domain of state
power.
Id. at 47.
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Clause in Lopez also applied in Raich,128 and that under the Court's
analysis, Congress could have justified the regulation in Lopez as part
of a larger scheme regulating commerce in guns. 129 Lopez did not
invite such evasion, O'Connor argued, but instead required the Court
to identify "objective markers" that properly limit congressional
powers in Commerce Clause cases. 130 O'Connor explained: "The task is
to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate more
than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less
than everything (by declining to let Congress set the terms of
13
analysis)." 1
O'Connor identified several such markers in Raich. First, both
the CSA and state law recognized that medical and non-medical use of
drugs "are realistically distinct and can be segregated" for regulatory
purposes.1 32 Second, respondents limited their claim to statepermitted, physician-prescribed, medical marijuana.'3 3 Third, Raich
arose in a regime of overlapping federal and state regulation in an
area of criminal law in which "[s]tates lay claim by right of history and
expertise."' 34 Finally, California had drawn upon its reserved powers
135
to distinguish medicinal and recreational use of marijuana.
O'Connor also identified three factors that distinguished Raich
from Wickard. First, after rejecting the majority's "dictionary
definition" of economics as "breathtaking,"'' 36 O'Connor maintained
that unlike wheat, "[t]he home grown cultivation and personal use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes has no apparent commercial
character."' 137 Second, in contrast with the broad reach of the CSA, the
Agricultural Act of 1938 exempted "small-scale, noncommercial wheat
farming."' 38 Finally, O'Connor maintained that while the Wickard
128. First, Lopez involved criminal activity that was not economic. See id. at 44. Second, the
Gun-Free School Zones Act contained no express jurisdictional element linking the regulated
activity to commerce. Id. Third, Congress had made no legislative findings that linked the
regulated activity to commerce. Id. And finally, the Court's analysis revealed the linkage
between the regulated activity and commerce to be attenuated. Id. at 44-45.
129. Id. at 46.
130. Id. at 47.
131. Id. at 47-48.
132. Id. at 48.
133. Id.
134. Id.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 49.
137. Id. at 50. In addition, O'Connor noted that marijuana is "highly unusual" in that it can
be manufactured entirely with local materials that have not traveled interstate. Id.
138. See id. at 51 ("'When Filburn planted the wheat at issue in Wickard, the statute
exempted plantings less than 200 bushels (about six tons), and when he harvested his wheat it
exempted plantings less than six acres.").
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Court relied upon stipulations concerning the effects of domestically
produced wheat on the overall market, 139 in Raich, Congress's findings
amounted to no more than a bold claim concerning the need for an
absolute ban. 140 O'Connor concluded that in contrast with Raich,
"Wickard... did not extend Commerce Clause authority to something
14 1
as modest as the home cook's herb garden."
E. Justice Thomas' Dissent
In an independent dissent, Justice Thomas reiterated his call
for fundamental Commerce Clause reform, as set out in his Lopez
concurrence, claiming that the original meaning of commerce was
limited to the buying and selling of goods and services. 142 Under this
more radical approach to Commerce Clause reform, Thomas would
reject altogether the category of cases allowing Congress to regulate
local activities on the ground that they have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce without regard to whether the activities
themselves, or their effect on commerce, can be described as economic.
In his Lopez opinion, Thomas steadfastly rejected the Wickard
multiplier analysis as a clever but limitless argument. 14 3 In Raich,
however, Thomas maintained that even the substantial effects test did
not provide a basis for allowing Congress to apply the CSA to
respondents' activities. Because Raich presented an as-applied, rather
than a facial, challenge, Thomas argued, it was not sufficient for the
claimed exercise of congressional commerce power to maintain that
unregulated marijuana growers could "swell" the market for
marijuana. 144 Instead, the issue was whether, given the statutory
limits upon permissible use in California, it was necessary and proper
to the CSA to limit even locally grown marijuana specifically intended
for medical use. 145 Thomas concluded that the answer was no.
139. See id. at 53 ("Critically, the Court was able to consider 'actual effects' because the
parties had 'stipulated a summary of the economics of the wheat industry."' (quoting Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942))).
140. See id. (claiming that the congressional findings "amount to nothing more than a
legislative insistence that the regulation of controlled substances must be absolute," and that
"[tihese bare declarations cannot be compared to the record before the Court in Wickard').
141. Id. at 51.
142. See id. at 58-59 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
143. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The
aggregation principle is clever, but has no stopping point.").
144. Raich, 545 U.S. at 61 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 63-64. Thus, Thomas stated:
But even assuming that States' controls allow some seepage of medical
marijuana into the illicit drug market, there is a multibillion-dollar interstate
market for marijuana. It is difficult to see how this vast market could be
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II. DEVISING A GAME THEORETICAL MODEL OF PERMISSIBLE
COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS

What emerges most prominently from the prior discussion is
that none of the four Raich opinions offers a framework with which to
develop a comprehensive normative theory of the Commerce Clause
that is capable of reconciling the expansive post-New Deal cases with
the Supreme Court's more recent project of imposing meaningful
limits on the permissible scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
powers. Justice Stevens treated all Commerce Clause cases, beginning
in the late nineteenth century, as a uniform whole, and inquired,
based upon the Lopez non-economic activities test, whether
respondents' activities were "economic." But in answering this
question, Stevens relied upon a dictionary definition that, ironically,
prevented a meaningful economic analysis of the permissible scope of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers. While Stevens placed Raich and
Wickard in the same doctrinal category, he did so by resorting to a
version of the very formalism that Wickard rejected, now including
what had once been a pre-commerce activity within Congress's core
regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause.
Justice Scalia, who instead rested his analysis primarily on the
Necessary and Proper Clause, maintained that Congress's powers
included the power to regulate non-economic activity and activity that
did not have a substantial effect on commerce, provided that Congress
regulated such activity within the context of a more comprehensive
legislative scheme. This analysis also placed Wickard and Raich in the
same doctrinal category, but again failed to offer a means of imposing
meaningful limits on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
powers, other than counterintuitively insisting upon broader

affected by diverted medical cannabis, let alone in a way that makes
regulating intrastate medical marijuana obviously essential to controlling the
interstate drug market.
Id. at 64 (citing OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

NCJ No. 198099, ONDCP DRUG POLICY INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE FACT SHEET: MARIJUANA
5 (2004)). Legalizing marijuana can have both a supply side and a demand side effect. While
Thomas focused on the demand side, namely how marijuana can seep from the legal to the illegal
market, it is also possible that the increased demand from medical marijuana can affect the
supply of the illegal drug. The supply side effect is also unlikely to rise to a sufficient magnitude
to substantially affect interstate commerce, however, because as Justice Stevens noted for the
majority, part of the supply will be home grown, and thus limited to the intended user, see id. at
7 (majority opinion) (noting that 'Monson cultivates her own marijuana"), and because there is
no evidence to support the claim that additional supplies for approved medical users from illegal
producers will have a substantial spillover effect with respect to illicit users given the vast scope
of the illicit marijuana market, see id. at 64 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing magnitude of
the illicit marijuana market).
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regulatory schemes to sustain the narrowest applications. Moreover,
Scalia did not demand an economic justification for either the broader
regulatory scheme itself or the narrower class of activity attached to
it.
In her principal dissent, Justice O'Connor distinguished
Wickard and Raich, but employed an alternative formalistic analysis
in doing so. Applying O'Connor's analysis, Congress could evade any
judicially imposed limits on the scope of its Commerce Clause powers
provided it jumped through certain hoops, including, most
importantly, exempting some even narrower class of activity or
articulating "findings" that linked the regulated activity to commerce.
Finally, in his separate and broader dissent, Justice Thomas
appeared to agree that Wickard and Raich fall into the same category,
but rejected the category on normative grounds. Abolishing the
and limiting the permissible
substantial
effects
category,
understanding of commerce to exchange, would produce a radical
retrenchment of Commerce Clause doctrine and call into question the
continuing validity of many Commerce Clause cases decided in the
post-New Deal era.
Finding a viable theory that can reconcile the broad post-New
Deal expansion of Commerce Clause powers with the more recent
efforts at retrenchment requires a careful understanding of the
relationship between "economics" and the Commerce Clause. A proper
economic analysis of the Commerce Clause demonstrates that, holding
Raich aside, almost all of the post-New Deal cases-including most
notably Wickard, Lopez, and Morrison-fit within a coherent and
functional conception of the permissible scope of Congress's Commerce
Clause powers.
The theory of the Commerce Clause set out below is simple.
When Congress can rationally infer that individual states have an
incentive to obstruct rather than advance a selected regulatory
scheme, then only a central coordinating authority, namely Congress
itself, can create a vehicle for implementing and enforcing that
scheme. Among the principal benefits of this normative theory is that
it aligns the economic analysis of the doctrines governing the
permissible scope of Congress's Commerce Clause powers with the
doctrines governing the use of the Commerce Clause, operating in its
dormant capacity, as a source of limitation on the permissible scope of
146
state regulatory powers.
146. For my comprehensive assessment of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, see
Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant Commerce
Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MVARY L. REV. 1 (2003). In that article, I demonstrated that almost all
dormant Commerce Clause cases could be explained by introducing a second game theoretical
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Coordination difficulties, as shown below, arise primarily in
two contexts. First, they arise when individual firms or states could
evade a scheme affecting pricing, working conditions, or
environmental regulations. Second, they arise when individual states
could pursue policies that impose geographical obstructions or
inhibitions to commerce. Using two simple games, the prisoners'
dilemma and the multiple Nash equilibrium game, 147 this Part
identifies the conditions under which defection from beneficial
coordination is likely to arise, and thus, when central regulation
involving congressional Commerce Clause powers is justified.
In this Part, I will further draw upon actual Commerce Clause
cases to the extent that they are helpful in developing the formal
models. Other applications are presented in Part III. The analysis
begins with an alternative account of Wickard, based upon the
prisoners' dilemma, which explains how Congress has used its
Commerce Clause power to develop solutions to coordination problems
that are beyond the competence of states, acting on their own, to enact
unilaterally. I then apply the model in two other contexts that present
similar coordination problems.
A. Coordinationon the Supply Side: Wickard v. Filburn and Cartel
Enforcement
Let us now reconsider Wickard v. Filburn.148 Wickard emerged
in the aftermath of the Great Depression, during a period in which a
major wheat glut resulted in a dramatic decline in wheat prices.
Congress enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to propose a referendum,
subject to a two-thirds majority vote among wheat farmers, which
would result in the imposition of a "compulsory national marketing
quota. ' 149 Filburn, who was penalized for violating his quota, raised,

dimension beyond the traditional justification of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as
solving a prisoners' dilemma among potentially defecting states. See id. at 69-117. By also
considering the possibility that states can upset a benign multiple Nash equilibrium game that
facilitates the flow of commerce, the analysis reconciles not only the dormant Commerce Clause
cases, see id. at 123-54, but also such related doctrines as the market participant cases, Article
IV privileges and immunities doctrine, and the export taxation doctrine, see id. at 118-23.
147. The analysis also draws upon insights from the empty core bargaining game to
demonstrate the circumstances under which moves from decentralized to centralized decision
making, or the reverse, among three or more players, can produce superadditive gains. See infra
notes 162-64 and accompanying text.

148. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
149. Id. at 115.
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29

among other arguments, a claim that, as applied to him, the 1938
statute exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power.
The Wickard opinion is almost invariably cited for its
multiplier analysis. 150 Focusing on other, less well known aspects of
the case helps to lay a foundation for the first game justifying
congressional Commerce Clause authority. With respect to the four
wheat net exporter nations, Jackson explained: "It is interesting to
note that all of these have federated systems of government, not of
course without important differences. In all of them, wheat regulation
is by the national government."'1 51 This raises the question why none
of the four net export nations employed a decentralized solution to the
problem of depressed wheat pricing. 152
Justice Jackson also explained the incentives that the
coordinated scheme created for individual producers like Filburn: "It
is agreed that as the result of the wheat programs he is able to market
his wheat at a price 'far above any world price based on the natural
reaction of supply and demand.' "153 Jackson recognized that while
small scale producers, like Filburn, were given a choice to cooperate
54
and receive the higher price, or not to cooperate and be penalized,
the quota produced an incentive to reap the benefit of the heightened
155
price while avoiding the imposed restrictions that created it.
These two observations help to explain Wickard as more than a
clever argument premised upon the very multiplier analysis that the
56
Court had then recently rejected in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.1
150. See supra text accompanying note 102 (quoting passage from Wickard, 317 U.S. at 12728).
151. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 126 n.27. Jackson also explained:
The four large exporting countries of Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the
United States have all undertaken various programs for the relief of growers.
Such measures have been designed, in part at least, to protect the domestic
price received by producers. Such plans have generally evolved towards
control by the central government.
Id. at 125-26.
152. Indeed, Justice Jackson suggested an evolutionary process in which experimentation
with more local regulation among the net exporter nations failed to produce the desired effect,
prompting central regulatory controls. See id.
153. Id. at 130-31.
154. Id. at 130.
155. See id. at 133.
156. 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936). In Carter,the Court held:
If the production by one man of a single ton of coal intended for interstate
sale and shipment, and actually so sold and shipped, affects interstate
commerce indirectly, the effect does not become direct by multiplying the
tonnage, or increasing the number of men employed, or adding to the expense
or complexities of the business, or by all combined.
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Instead, Wickard rested upon an intuition, albeit one not fully
developed into a theory, that certain structural conditions required
policies to operate strictly at the national level, and that once those
policies were implemented, enforcement was most effective if coupled
with a signal operating at the lowest level of agreed upon restraint. 157
To generalize the problem, imagine that in a given year there is
an anticipated wheat glut that will force down prices below an
acceptable level. A price increase can be affected either by enhancing
demand or by restricting supply. 158 The question then is how to
accomplish this, a problem that is well understood in the literature on
the theory of cartels. 159 If several producers that collectively possess
market power over their products seek to raise their prices, they can
achieve this objective most easily by agreeing to collective restrictions
on their aggregate outputs. The ideal restriction is one that would
replicate the outputs of a single firm controlling production for the
entire market. A firm with complete market power faces a downward
sloping demand curve and a corresponding marginal revenue curve, as
shown in Figure 1.

157. This is not to suggest that the scheme would not have produced any monopolistic rent if
only the larger producers' outputs were cartelized, and in fact, this observation helps to explain
why large producers were motivated to coerce smaller ones to comply through the two-thirds
voting requirement. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115-16.
158. See id. at 127 ("The maintenance by government regulation of a price for wheat
undoubtedly can be accomplished as effectively by sustaining or increasing the demand as by
limiting the supply.").
159. For general discussions of cartel theory, see GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE
228-32 (4th ed. 1987); see also Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and
Horizontal Merger, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 415, 417-24 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (discussing cartels and factors relating to collusion
and cheating).
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Figure 1 depicts a downward sloping demand curve, which
confronts a monopolistic firm operating within a noncompetitive
market, or which confronts the aggregation of firms operating within a
competitive market. 160 For the market as a whole, the price is set
where the supply and demand curves for all producers and consumers
meet. In Figure 1, this results in Qc and Pc. For any individual firm
within a competitive market, the demand curve is effectively flat and
is set at the equilibrium price for the market as a whole. In contrast, if
the market is controlled by a single monopolistic firm, the demand
curve for that firm is not flat, but rather is the downward sloping
curve for the entire market. While the monopolistic firm must consider
the downward sloping demand curve, it must also consider the
marginal revenue curve, which is also downward sloping and which
lies below the demand curve. That is because if we assume an inability
to segment the market and thus to engage in price discrimination,
then for each additional unit sold, the price drops for all units sold of
the same good up to that point based upon the reduction in price for
the marginal increase in output along the demand curve. In setting an
160. For a more detailed discussion that includes an analysis of various forms of rent and of
rent seeking, see Stearns, supra note 146, at 97-102; MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 111-17 (1997); MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI,
PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW ch. 1 (forthcoming West Publishing Co.

2008) (providing price theory appendix). For a firm that has no market power, and thus no
control over prices, in contrast, the relevant demand curve is effectively flat.
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optimal price, therefore, the monopolistic firm considers the marginal
revenue curve, which reflects the consequences of incremental price
reductions for all units sold as the monopolist sells at various levels of
output. The monopolist's ideal strategy is to set price where marginal
cost, or supply, equals marginal revenue, and then to set price for that
level of output along the corresponding demand curve. In Figure 1,
this means that the optimal strategy for a monopolistic firm is to set
quantity at Qm and price at Pm. This scheme not only allows the
monopolistic firm to set price at a monopolistic level, but also, and
more importantly, to secure monopolistic rents. Monopolistic rents
refer to the different level of "profit" associated with pricing schemes
that predominate in competitive versus monopolistic markets. 161
The difficulty that confronts members of a cartel-in contrast
with a single monopolistic firm-is one of coordination. Unlike the
monopolistic firm, cartel members do not have individual control of
the entire market output. Assuming no legal barriers to horizontal
price fixing, the would-be cartelists are motivated to agree upon
outputs that correspond to the level that a monopolistic firm would
achieve, and then to use the reduction in outputs to command a
monopolistic price, and thus to secure monopoly rents. The problem,
however, involves setting and enforcing the necessary allocations.
While farmers might agree on the desire to secure monopoly
rents, they are less likely to agree on how the necessary production
cuts should be allocated to produce that result. The difficulties that
firms confront in determining such allocations can be assessed based
upon a game theoretical insight that involves core theory. Core theory
demonstrates that for any potential coalition of manufacturers
proposing a scheme of output reductions, an alternative, superior
coalition exists that will benefit from an alternative scheme that

161. In Figure 1, supra p.131, the rent comprises the reduction in the competitive rents,
boxes B and D, associated with a market in which demand is downward sloping for the industry
as a whole, but is flat for individual firms. Even though no individual firm is large enough
relative to the overall market to affect prices by reducing its outputs, substantial differences
remain among individual firms. As a result of differences in soil conditions, climates, or other
factors, some firms obtain, at the price controlled by the market, relatively higher competitive
rents than others. The aggregation of these rents is depicted in areas B and C, which lie above
the marginal cost curve. By moving from a competitive to a monopolistic price, the affected firms
instead obtain the monopolistic profit, as depicted in areas A and B, which lie above the marginal
cost curve but to the left of the level of output set at Qm. Because the firms gain rents equal to
(A+B), but lose the competitive rents (B+D), the monopolistic rent (A-D), represents the
improved payoff to the industry as a whole of moving from a competitive to a monopolistic price.
For a more detailed discussion, see Stearns, supra note 146, and cite therein.
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improves the position of a newly constituted
group of
manufacturers. 162
Empty cores are endemic to policymaking because they arise
whenever there is a gain, or superadditivity, that results from
replacing atomistic decision making with coordinated behavior. 163 The
empty core reflects the absence of a unique or even dominant
equilibrium solution in allocating the superadditive gains. 164 One
solution to the problem of bargaining in the absence of a core is
65
government coercion, and this no doubt characterizes Wickard.1
Assume for now that the parties have agreed to an allocation
formula, for example uniform percentage cuts based upon the prior
year's production, or based upon an average over the prior five years'
production. Even assuming such agreement, the parties confront an
equally daunting task of monitoring and punishing defection. Once
production quotas are set and the resulting price is raised from the
competitive to the oligopolistic equilibrium levels, 166 the cartel
162. See generally John S. Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 558
(1987) (describing empty core game).
163. Empty core bargaining games can also arise in reverse, namely in replacing centralized
coordination with decentralized decision making. As shown in Figure 1, supra p.131, moving
from competitive to noncompetitive pricing produces a societal welfare loss, representing the part
of the consumer surplus that is not transferred to the producer. (The part of the consumer
surplus transferred to the producer is a wealth transfer rather than a welfare loss.) While the
cartel game involves the allocation of gains resulting from centrally coordinating outputs, the
game focuses solely on the benefit to the producers, without accounting for the resulting societal
welfare loss. Congress can also facilitate superadditive gains by encouraging a competitive or
decentralized decision making regime. As shown in the discussion of environmental regulation,
the possibility of such gains sometimes proves essential in encouraging states to effectuate
various policies associated with waste storage. See infra Part II.C.
164. For my more detailed introduction to the problem of the empty core, see Maxwell L.
Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1233-47 (1994)
(exploring various implications of empty core bargaining for institutional design).
165. Thus, while the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 allowed one-third plus one
producers to veto a proffered scheme of allocations, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 116 (1942),
a lower percentage in opposition, perhaps reflecting the local growers whose home grown wheat,
like that of Filburn, competed with wheat in commerce, was effectively coerced by the
supermajority's agreed upon allocation scheme. Notice that the referendum of wheat growers
held on May 31, 1941, was approved by eighty-one percent to nineteen percent. Id.
166. Oligopoly refers to a group of producers that collectively possess market power, and
thus a downward sloping demand curve, as opposed to a monopolist, who has exclusive market
power. The demand curve confronting an individual firm in an oligopoly takes a somewhat
different form from that facing a monopolist as depicted in Figure 1, supra p.131. For the
individual firm in an oligopoly, the demand curve appears "kinked." Demand is highly inelastic
(meaning a change in price results in a dramatic reduction in quantity purchased) when the
oligopolist raises price above the point of equilibrium for the oligopoly as a whole, and is highly
elastic (meaning that a lowering of the price results in a dramatic increase in the quantity
purchased) for prices below the set equilibrium point for the oligopoly as a whole. See William
Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging Corporate Inventors to Sell Patents, 58
MIAMI L.Q. 1045, 1112 (2004) ("[T]he producers in an oligopoly are faced with a downward

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 1:1

members suddenly have a strong incentive to cheat by producing
above quota. 167 Assuming that a mechanism for punishment exists, or
that detection of cheating threatens to unravel the cartel, rational
cartelists will try to cheat, albeit in sufficiently modest amounts to
escape detection. If a sufficient number cheat, however, the aggregate
effect is to move the now cartelized price back in the direction of the
168
competitive market price.
In effect, the cartel members confront a classic prisoners'
dilemma. Each member obtains a higher payout by cooperating,
meaning that he or she accepts the assigned or agreed upon quota,
thus producing a lower level of output sold at a higher price. Once the
higher price is achieved as a result of the overall quota scheme,
however, it is then rational for each cartel member to cheat in an
effort to capture more of the gains associated with the abovecompetitive pricing strategy. The prisoners' dilemma characterizes
this game because each producer has the same incentive to cheat
without regard to what the remaining producers do. If all other
members cooperate, thus abiding the assigned quota, then for any
given firm, there is an incentive to cheat and to sell more at the higher
price. Conversely, if the other firms cheat, it remains rational to cheat
and thus to capture as much of the higher price as possible until the
overall pricing scheme erodes. Because these payoffs are reciprocal,
the dominant outcome is mutual defection.
Table 1 depicts the resulting game, using two firms, A and B.
Table 1: The Prisoners' Dilemma
Payoffs for (A,B)

A Cooperates

A Cheats

B Cooperates

(10, 10)

(12, 5)

B Cheats

(5, 12)

(7,7)

sloping demand curve, and can charge prices in excess of marginal cost, and generally each
producer is reluctant to charge a price that is significantly different from the other producers in
the market."). For a general discussion of oligopolistic pricing, see ROBERT L. HEILBRONER &
LESTER C. THUROW, UNDERSTANDING MICROECONOMICS

180 (1975) (providing illustration of

kinked demand curve).
167. See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 25 (2005) (describing cheating as "a primordial

economic act").
168. Again, cheating would not necessarily eliminate all potential monopolistic rents. See
supra note 157.
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For expositional purposes, Table 1 considers a prisoners'
dilemma game involving two firms that together have market
power. 169 If firms A and B cooperate, each receives a payoff of 10,
which results from optimally reduced production and resulting higher
prices. If instead one party cheats, then as a result of the additional
production, the price will erode somewhat for both parties, albeit not
as much as if both parties cheated. The cheating party receives a
benefit because she sells more than her allotted share at a noncompetitive price, even if the price is slightly lower than that resulting
from strict cartel enforcement in a regime of mutual cooperation.
Conversely, because the price has eroded as a result of one party's
cheating, the party who cooperated, and thus limited production to the
assigned allocation at the now slightly reduced price, receives a
reduced payoff relative to mutual cooperation. The resulting payoffs
are 12 for the cheating party and 5 for the cooperating party. Finally,
if both parties cheat, the price erodes entirely to the competitive
levels. While each party produces as much as is cost effective, the
resulting payoff of 7 is lower than the potential payoff of 10 associated
with mutual cooperation.
As is generally true in prisoners' dilemmas, the relationships
between and among the numbers are important, rather than the
actual numbers. Given the payoff relationships in this game,
regardless of what the other player does, it is rational for each player
to cheat. This is true even though if the cartel were enforced, each
player would receive a higher payoff than in the resulting regime of
mutual defection.
Because it is rational for the cartel members to cheat, the
question arises how to prevent mutual defection. An obvious, and
powerful, solution is to seek governmental enforcement. Government
enforcement offers three significant benefits. First, by having the
government, rather than the parties, impose and enforce the quotas,
the parties avoid any legal repercussions associated with privately
agreed-upon horizontal price fixing. 170 Second, allowing the
government to set quotas ameliorates some of the difficulties
associated with agreeing on allocations by creating a coercive
169. While this game depicts two firms, the essential intuition can be generalized to any size
cartel.
170. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 263

(1978) (discussing benefits of ban on horizontal price fixing in promoting consumer welfare); see
also Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Future
Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 392-93 (2003)
(explaining FTC policy of pursuing enforcement actions against "naked horizontal agreements
such as pure price fixing, naked output restraints or market divisions, and bans on advertising,"
and other means by which firms make peace with each other but to the detriment of consumers).
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mechanism against those who would hold out for a superior
allocation. 171 Third, and most importantly, government enforcement
provides the necessary mechanism to monitor and punish cheating.172
These insights help to explain Justice Jackson's observation in
Wickard that in each wheat net exporting nation, which by
coincidence had a federalist form of government,1 73 the wheat
production scheme operated at the national level. While the prior
analysis explained the need for governmental intervention, we now
need to explain why in a nation characterized by federalism, such a
scheme must be implemented nationally rather than among separate
states.
Thankfully, the analysis is simple in that it tracks the
presentation of the prisoners' dilemma confronting two firms. Imagine
a federalist system with two states, A and B, which both produce
wheat during a glut. Ideally, each state, A and B, would recognize the
need for a quota, and both would impose output restrictions that
result in the equivalent of monopolistic pricing. The difficulty,
however, is that each state realizes that the ideal regime is one in
which the other state strictly sets and enforces its quotas, thus raising
the price to the monopolistic level, while allowing its own farmers to
cheat by producing above quota to capture more sales at the now
higher price. If instead the other state cheats, it still remains rational
to cheat. While each state would receive a higher payoff in a regime of
mutual cooperation, thus adhering to the agreed-upon quotas, because
both states are motivated to cheat regardless of what the other state
does, the dominant outcome is mutual defection. The payoffs in Table
1, this time with states rather than firms as the players, capture the
basic game and explain why a decentralized solution to imposing a
quota-and-monitoring regime will not suffice to create an optimal
174
output-and-pricing scheme within a federalist system.
171. For an analysis applying this to the two-thirds rule in Wickard, see supra note 165.
Cooperative advertising programs, an example of which the Supreme Court recently struck down
as a First Amendment violation, raise similar concerns about coercing small firms to join
schemes that benefit larger producers. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405
(2001) (striking mushroom check-off program on grounds that it forced contributions for the
purpose of advertising, rather than some other associational benefit).
172. Kenneth Davidson, 1982 Merger Guidelines: The Competitive Significance of Segmented
Markets, 71 CAL. L. REV. 445, 451 (1983) ("The temptation to cheat appears to have been too
great to maintain price agreements purely through voluntary undertakings. To be sure, price
fixing can be sustained if enforced or supported by government action, as is the case with many
agricultural products.").
173. Hopefully most would agree that net wheat exporter status is an unlikely cause of
federalism.
174. In theory, the same prisoners' dilemma among firms and states that requires a federal
solution to cartelizing wheat outputs could recur among wheat exporter nations, thus
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The analysis thus far highlights an important point about
Commerce Clause regulation. In facilitating a scheme of output
reductions and raised prices, Congress is providing a benefit to wheat
producers that economists would classify as a form of rent. Public
choice economists are critical of rent-seeking behavior. In part this is
the result of the societal welfare loss that rent seeking produces
(consider the lost consumer's surplus resulting from the move from
competitive to noncompetitive pricing), 175 and in part it is because of
the deadweight losses resulting from rent seeking activity itself.176
And yet, the Wickard Court sustained the application of the penalty
used to preserve the new pricing scheme as applied to Filburn. This
implies that the Commerce Clause doctrine as articulated in Wickard,
inquiring whether the regulated activity has a substantial economic
effect on commerce, does not demand that Congress only exercise
Commerce Clause power to produce efficient results. Even rentseeking activity is condoned under the Commerce Clause provided
there is a structural economic justification for implementing the
selected scheme centrally, rather than on a state-by-state basis.
While the preceding structural analysis might make Wickard
appear an easy case justifying congressional intervention, 1 77 one
important step remains. Once we employ a central authority to set
quotas, what is to prevent individual producers from cheating, or the
states from failing to enforce the resulting agreement?
To ensure compliance with the established wheat cartel, it is
also critical to signal that defection, or at least defection above a
certain point, will not be tolerated. The issue is how to send the
appropriate signal. One might imagine sending a signal to the largest
producers who cheat, thus ensuring that other large-scale producers
undermining the pricing scheme. This is less likely, however, because unlike states, which are
forbidden to discriminate in commerce by the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the United
States can effect an import quota or tariff to protect domestically raised prices and thus can
prevent other nations from dissipating the gains to affected farmers. For a helpful discussion, see
David R. Purnell, A Critical Examination of the Targeted Export Assistance Program, Its
Transformation into the Market Promotion Program and Its Future, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.

REG. 551, 580 n.141 (1993) (describing statutory changes to Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
affecting power to impose quotas and tariffs).
175. More precisely, under a competitive pricing structure, the consumer surplus is (A+C),
but because monopolistic pricing allocates A to the producers, the deadweight societal loss is
represented in area C. For a more detailed discussion, see Stearns, supra note 146, at 97-102
(discussing various forms of rent).
176. For seminal works on rent seeking, see Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the
Rent-Seeking Society, 6 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 302 (1974); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).

177. This argument is based solely upon the Commerce Clause doctrine. See infra note 186,
and cites therein (arguing that challenges to the merits of these policies should rest on other
constitutional bases).
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cooperate. The problem is that signals work in more than one
direction. Signaling enforcement against top producers also signals to
those who are not top producers that cheating will be tolerated. The
government can, of course, start at the top and gradually work its way
down, thus determining the point at which it is no longer cost effective
to monitor and punish cheaters. The difficulty, however, is that such
an approach sends a clear signal to producers below a certain size that
although their defection is not legal, as against them, the law will not
be enforced. 178
Now consider an alternative approach. What about sending a
signal by enforcing the cartel against the smallest producer who falls
within the quota policy approved by Congress and set by the Secretary
of Agriculture with the requisite approval of two-thirds of the wheat
producers? By enforcing the law against a recalcitrant small scale
producer like Filburn, the Secretary of Agriculture sends a highly
effective, low-cost signal that the cartel will be enforced as envisioned
in the law that created it. Certainly if the government is willing to
invest resources prosecuting Filburn, all other producers-from those
slightly larger than Filburn to the largest wheat producers-will be on
notice that their cheating will not be tolerated.
Let us once again consider the much-criticized passage from
Justice Jackson's Wickard opinion: "That appellee's own contribution
to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to
remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly
situated, is far from trivial."179 Commentators have read this passage
to mean that Congress has the power to regulate any activity,
regardless of its scope, because by multiplying that activity by a
sufficiently large number, the effect is to produce the same activity on
a national scale.'8 0 A more cautious reading, however, suggests that
without authority to signal enforcement of the wheat production
178. When the signal is noisy and enforcement costs are high, as for example is frequently
the case in fighting street crime, a triage approach makes considerable sense. When signaling is
less noisy and enforcement costs are lower, in contrast, it makes sense to send a clear signal at a
lower level.
179. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
180. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A
ComparativeAnalysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1204 n.92 (2003). Pushaw wrote:
In particular, the Wickard Court allowed Congress to regulate anything it
pleased by (1) upholding legislation that concerned noncommercial activities
(such as growing wheat for personal consumption rather than sale) merely
because they had a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, and (2)
finding that this effect could be measured by aggregating activities that were
trivial in themselves.
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allocations at the level set by Congress, the Secretary of Agriculture
would not have been able to prevent the mass of producers who were
similarly situated to Filburn and whose activities were a major source
of competition with wheat in commerce, from cheating from their
production quotas. 8 1 Absent that ability to control collective outputs,

181. Recall that consumption of home grown wheat varied in an amount of over 20% of
average production. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127. For a thoughtful and largely complementary
analysis, see Ann Althouse, Enforcing FederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
793, 818 (1996). Although Professor Althouse does not rest her analysis on game theory, she
recognizes a coordination difficulty preventing wheat producers themselves from controlling
outputs to bolster prices. See id. The particular problem in Wickard, however, is not merely
explaining the need for regulatory intervention, but also explaining (1) why intervention had to
be implemented at the federal, rather than state or local, level, and (2) why, once implemented, it
was appropriate to enforce the scheme against a small scale producer like Filburn. Althouse
posits:
Though local and small-scale, the individual behavior regulated really did
contribute to an interstate phenomenon, which states could not address on an
individual basis. Indeed, high levels of production by local businesses were
unlikely even to be perceived as problems at the local level. The problem
existed only in the aggregate, thus demonstrating the national character of
the problem.
Id. Of course depressed wheat prices were perceived as a problem in all affected areas, and
although small scale violators contributed to the glut, this explanation ultimately follows the
logic of the multiplier analysis. In contrast, the game theoretical analysis presented in the text
explains not only the need for regulatory intervention at the federal level, but also the benefits of
a strong signal against a small scale producer like Filburn.
For an article and book chapter that offer an alternative economic defense of Wickard, see
Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719 (2003); Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v.
Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation, and CongressionalPower over Commerce, in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW STORIES 69-118 (Michael Dorf ed., 2004). Of particular note is Professor Chen's thoughtful
analysis, which transforms Ronald Coase's Theory of the Firm into a provocative theory of the
farm. Chen observes:
Justice Jackson admitted that wheat which "is never marketed.., supplies a
need of the man who grew it, which would otherwise be reflected by
purchases in the open market." There is no better statement in United States
Reports of Ronald Coase's Nobel Prize-winning observation that vertical
integration and open-market purchases are flip sides of the same economic
phenomenon.
Chen, Filburn'sLegacy, supra, at 1763. Chen suggests that Wickard was a pyrrhic victory in
which the government, by successfully regulating outputs on small farms, prevented the
necessary creative deployment of resources (and resulting creative accounting to circumvent
such regulations) that permitted small farms to thrive. See id. at 1763-66. As Professor Chen
recognizes, the theory of the farm ultimately rests upon the Wickard multiplier analysis, and
specifically a finding that the aggregate effect of wheat farming on individual scale affects
commerce. See id. Thus, he notes that "each wheat farmer's seemingly discrete act, multiplied
across a large population, profoundly affected prices and supplies in the larger market," id. at
1761, and that "[an] agriculturally literate understanding of Filburn makes it impossible to
argue that any realm of profitable enterprise is strictly local, let alone private." Id. at 1756.
While I agree with Professor Chen that "Congress unquestionably had the power to regulate this
market," id. at 1761, in this Article I have supported that result with an alternative game
theoretical account of Wickard that focuses on the specific structural concerns that motivate
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the result would have been to allow a gradual erosion of the federal
policy implementing production quotas to boost wheat prices.
While the decision is often ridiculed, Wickard is actually an
easy Commerce Clause case. But it is not easy under any of the four
normative theories of Commerce Clause doctrine expressed in the
opinions in Raich. Once the wheat producers settled on the policy to
boost prices by coordinating outputs, two essential steps remained.
First, the quotas themselves had to be determined and imposed by a
central coordinating authority. Second, that authority had to signal
that above the point determined in the agreed upon scheme, which
included exemptions based upon the small scale of production,18 2 the
quota scheme would be strictly enforced. Filburn, although operating
on a small scale, operated above the cutoff point for the
implementation of the selected federal policy.
Read in context, Justice Jackson's famous passage does not rest
on the intuition that a small activity is subject to federal regulation
because it can be multiplied to achieve a larger level of the same
activity. Instead, Justice Jackson asserted that the selected
production quotas will not achieve the goal of raising the price of
wheat unless they are enforced, and they will not be enforced absent a
proper signal. Justice O'Connor is correct that the Wickard Court
relied upon detailed stipulations concerning the effect of home-grown
wheat on the wheat market.1 8 3 However, those stipulations did not
merely demonstrate a link between something local and something
national. Instead, they demonstrated that home-produced wheat
proved among the most significant variable factors as a source of
competition for wheat in commerce. Failing to signal enforcement
against this group-local wheat producers whose production was
above the identified cutoff point for required enforcement-threatened
to move wheat pricing back in the direction of the previously
18 4
depressed competitive levels.
The cartel game is one of four games that justify central
coordinated intervention under the Commerce Clause. We will now
federal, as opposed to state level, regulatory intervention, and that uses this structural
understanding to go beyond Wickard's much criticized multiplier analysis.
182. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 130.
183. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 53 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184. While anxious readers undoubtedly appreciate the ease with which the Raich Court
could have distinguished Wickard, such an analysis remains premature. The goal is to provide a
comprehensive treatment of Commerce Clause doctrine, not simply an assessment of Raich.
Moreover, the coordination game involving cartel enforcement is but one of four games that
justify coordinated central regulation under the Commerce Clause. We must now consider the
remaining games justifying coordinated intervention and also a paradigm case in which none of
the games are implicated, and thus in which coordinated intervention is not justified.
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consider the remaining three games, and a paradigm case that
implicates none of the identified games.
B. Coordinationon the Demand Side: Regulating Working Conditions
Consider a policy to regulate certain conditions of employment.
Such regulations might include a prohibition against particular
sources of labor, for example, disallowing children below a certain age
from working at all or from working other than under specified
protective conditions, or general limitations on working conditions for
persons eligible to work, for example, minimum wages or maximum
hours. While economists and legal scholars have criticized laws
regulating working conditions on various normative grounds, 8 5 the
purpose here is not to assess the normative merit of labor
regulations.1 8 6 Instead, it is to address a more limited question:
Assuming agreement on the underlying policies expressed in these
laws, is a central coordinating authority required to implement them?
Based upon the preceding analysis, the answer is yes.
Assume a policy to prevent wages below a set minimum or to
limit maximum working hours per day or per week. If those selecting
the policy choose decentralized implementation, they would soon
realize that individual states, trying to adopt the scheme, once again,

185. These include (1) the libertarian principle that employers and workers should be
allowed to contract on mutually agreeable terms, see, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS:

THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

LAWS

135-40 (1992)

(arguing

against Supreme Court decisions sustaining minimum wage laws based upon libertarian
premises); (2) the policy argument that such laws disadvantage their claimed beneficiaries who
have fewer marketable skills and thus cannot secure work under the required contract terms,
see, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 358
(1946); Finis Welch, Minimum Wage Legislation in the United States, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 285
(1974); and (3) the public choice observation that such laws were often motivated by the desire of
present workers to limit competition, for example, from women, see Michael J. Phillips, The
Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 453, 497 (1998) ("[M]inimum wage
laws for women may have reflected the interests of male-dominated unions interested in
reducing competition for their members' services."). For a debate on the empirical question
whether minimum wage laws adversely affect unskilled workers, compare DAVID CARD & ALAN
B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (1995)

(questioning neo-classical analysis on empirical grounds), with Richard V. Burkhauser, Kenneth
A. Couch & David C. Wittenburg, "Who Gets What"from Minimum Wage Hikes: A Re-Estimation
of Card and Krueger's DistributionalAnalysis, in Myth and Measurement: The New Economics
of Minimum Wage, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 547, 547-52 (1996) (criticizing Card and Krueger
study on methodological grounds).
186. Whatever the merits of such arguments, and once again, the above competitive pricing
is a form of rent, they should be directed at arguments based upon due process, rather than
based upon the Commerce Clause. See Stearns, supra note 146, at 76 (arguing that the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine is not targeted against inefficient or rent-seeking laws, but at laws
that undermine the concept of political union among states).
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confront a prisoners' dilemma.18 7 Absent such regulation, firms
contract for labor on terms set by the market. Relative to a regime
imposing restrictions on labor contracting, market-based wages allow
firms to operate at lower cost. If not, firms would implement policies
reflecting societal consensus concerning proper working conditions
even absent regulatory intervention. Of course firms generally do not
elect to impose labor restrictions on themselves that raise the cost of
doing business as compared with competitors, and so the question
then arises how best to facilitate the desired regulatory regime.
First consider implementation at the state level in light of the
prisoners' dilemma in Table 1.188 Assuming minimum wage laws will
be implemented, all states would receive a relatively higher payoff if
the policy were implemented and enforced in a uniform fashion.
Whatever disadvantages minimum wage laws impose upon them, the
burden is diminished when all firms bear the burdens in like
fashion.18 9 This regime is depicted in the upper left box with payoffs of
(10, 10). From the perspective of any given state, however, the
preferred regime is one in which other states police their firms'
working conditions, while that state cheats by declining to police the
working conditions of its firms. This regime of unilateral defection is
depicted in the upper right and lower left boxes, with payoffs of (12, 5)
or (5, 12). The firms in the defecting state are able to compete with lax
regulatory enforcement against firms in states with strict regulatory
enforcement that are thus disadvantaged by the resulting higher labor
costs. And of course if other states also decline to adopt the preferred
labor policies, it remains rational for any individual state to defect,
producing the outcome of mutual defection, with the lowest mutual
payoffs (7, 7). As in the prior game, given the reciprocal payoffs, the
dominant outcome is mutual defection, even though each firm would
be better off in a regime of mutual cooperation.
This final point requires some clarification. Some might argue
that in this game the regime of mutual defection yields higher payoffs

187. We could, of course, replicate the problem by moving the analysis down one more level.
See supra Part II.A (considering prisoners' dilemma among firms in reducing outputs to raise
prices). If individual firms were called upon to implement the minimum wage or maximum hour
policy, they too would find themselves in a prisoners' dilemma, and thus require some form of
regulatory intervention. The question then, addressed in the text, is whether successful
regulation requires intervention at the state or federal level.
188. See supra Table 1 at p.134.
189. This is somewhat oversimplified. Certainly firms with a large cohort of unskilled
workers will be affected more than firms with mostly professional staffs whose salaries are
already well above the minimum wage. But assuming all states have a proportionate share of
both types of firms, the burdens resulting from uniform implementation will generally be equal
among the states.
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than mutual cooperation. Otherwise, there must be some market
failure that has prevented firms, absent regulation, from
implementing the preferred policy governing working conditions.
Stated differently, if in fact the firms would prefer not to abide the
minimum wage law, then mutual defection produces the optimal
result.
The difficulty with this argument is that the payoffs are based
on the assumption that the labor regulations will be implemented in
some fashion, and thus the relative payoffs result from potential
inconsistent enforcement. Defection can take any number of forms,
including articulating laws in an ambiguous manner or announcing
clear rules but declining to enforce them. If the choice is to have
inconsistent application of laws governing working conditions or laws
implemented uniformly against all firms, the payoffs in the latter
regime (represented in the upper left box depicting mutual
cooperation) are superior to those in the former regime (represented in
the lower right box depicting mutual defection). Again, however, from
the perspective of each individual firm, the ideal strategy is one in
which there is predicted and uniform enforcement in other states
against competitor firms, with non-enforcement or lax enforcement
against themselves.
The need for central coordination here represents the obverse
of the cartel game. While the cartel game works toward solving a
coordination problem on the supply side, in Wickard the supply of
wheat, this game resolves a coordination problem on the demand side,
here the demand for laborers. As in the cartel game, mutual
cooperation can only be achieved with central coordination. And in
fact, within the United States, such policies are implemented at the
federal level.1 90
With these two games in mind, let us now reconsider the
original formulation of the substantial effects test: "[E]ven if appellee's
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." 19 1 Laws
regulating production allocations and labor conditions both qualify. In
the absence of centrally imposed regulation, individual states would
decline to adopt a uniform system, and the effect would be that
individual states would have an incentive to depart from the selected
regulatory regime. The ultimate result of preventing congressional
regulation would be to allow individual states to thwart the desired
190. See infra Part III.B.1.
191. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
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policy as a means of improving the competitive position of their firms
with respect to those in other states.' 92 If we assume that in the
context of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause doctrine, "economic"
means having to do with the national economy, then the coordination
problem that individual states confront in implementing these
regulatory schemes explains why failing to allow Congress to regulate
even local incidents of such activity would have a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce.
C. Coordinationin Preservation:EnvironmentalRegulation
The final prisoners' dilemma game involves environmental
regulation. 193 This is an especially controversial area of Commerce
Clause regulation because the various federal statutes, including most
notably the Endangered Species Act, 194 have been used to prevent
economic development based upon the goal of preserving the habitats
of listed endangered species.' 95 Commentators have lamented that to
preserve endangered birds, rodents, or fish, people have been
prevented from engaging in gainful economic activity. 96 Once again,
the question here is not the merits of the environmental policy.
Instead, it is whether coordinated congressional regulation is needed
to effectuate the selected policy.
Imagine that a particular species of bird, say the spotted owl, is
on the endangered species list. Also imagine that the owl is present in
more than one state or that it migrates across state lines. Assume that
society wishes to preserve the owl, along with other endangered

192. Of course differences in competitive position are fine, but not when they result from the
inconsistent application of a chosen regulatory policy.
193. For a discussion of the recent Rapanos v. United States decision, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006),
which involves environmental regulation and which implicates both the multiple Nash
equilibrium bargaining game and the prisoners' dilemma, see infra notes 223-38 and
accompanying text.
194. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
195. See Laymont C. Hempel, EPA in the Year 2000. Perspectives and Priorities,21 ENVTL. L.
1493, 1504 (1991) ("Policy makers, caught in the middle, can be expected to retreat from
environmental commitments that appear to offer increased protection of nonhuman nature at
the expense of human comfort or economic development. Efforts to weaken the Endangered
Species Act, for example, may provide a crucial test of how far ecological goals can be separated
from instrumental values.").
196. See, e.g., Rufus C. Young, Jr., How the Endangered Species Act Affects Land Use, 16
A.L.I.-A.B.A.

COURSE MATERIALS J. 65, 65-78 (1992) (assessing implications on land use of

designated endangered species in Western states); Michael A. Yuffee, PriorAppropriations Water
Rights: Does Lucas Provide a Takings Action Against FederalRegulation Under the Endangered
Species Act?, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1217, 1218 (1993) ("Politicians are forced to make difficult value
judgments when faced with the choice of supporting economic development or protecting a bird
or fish from extinction.").
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species, and seeks to implement the scheme in a decentralized fashion.
What is the likely result?
Once again, refer to the prisoners' dilemma in Table 1.197
Assuming that the regulatory scheme will be implemented, states
receive the higher payoffs depicted in the upper left box (10, 10) if they
cooperate, thus implementing the policy uniformly. This not only
increases the probability of preserving the endangered species, but
also imposes roughly equal burdens on in-state developers who are
disadvantaged by the resulting restrictions. From the perspective of
each individual state, however, the actions of other states might be
necessary or sufficient to achieving the goal of species preservation. It
is possible that the species is sufficiently scarce that unless preserved
in all states, it will become extinct, but it is also possible that the
species could survive if only the other states preserved its habitat. As
a result, from the perspective of each individual state, the ideal
strategy is unilateral defection (with payoffs, represented in the upper
right and lower left boxes, of 12, 5 or 5, 12). In this case, unilateral
defection means declining to adopt or to enforce strict policies
concerning endangered species, while hoping that the other state
adheres to such policies. And finally, because it is rational for each
state to defect without regard to what the other state does, the
dominant outcome is mutual defection, as seen in the lower right box
(with payoffs of 7, 7).
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton,198 discussed at the John Roberts'
confirmation hearing, 199 might appear more difficult. In that case, a
developer was prevented from undertaking a project that threatened
the arroyo toad, a species endemic to California that was listed under
the Endangered Species Act. 20 0 Then-Judge Roberts had lamented
that "[tlhe panel's approach ...leads to the result that regulating the
taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of its own, lives its entire life
in California constitutes regulating 'Commerce ...among the several
states.' "201 The preceding analysis, however, helps to explain the
result. Assume that several states possess endemic endangered
species. If the desired policy is to protect endangered species generally
within the United States, then applying the preceding assumptions,
each individual state is motivated to relax internal enforcement, while
197. See supraTable 1 at p.134.
198. 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
199. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
200. See Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065 (explaining that the Secretary of the Interior listed
the arroyo toad in 1994).
201. Id. at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting from order denying petition for rehearing en banc)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
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hoping that the remaining states enforce the endangered species
preserving law more zealously. Once again, mutual defection emerges
as the dominant strategy in the absence of federal enforcement.
To be clear, it is certainly possible to imagine that the benefits
of preserving the spotted owl or the arroyo toad are sufficiently small
that the costs imposed upon potentially thwarted developers who
threaten their habitats produce a net societal loss. There are two
responses to this claim. First, whether or not this is true, and it is
certainly difficult to place meaningful values on competing claims of
environment preservation versus economic development, 2 2 the issue
once again is not whether the particular policy for which Congress
seeks to exercise its Commerce Clause power is welfare enhancing.
Instead, assuming that the policy will be implemented, the question is
which level of enforcement is required. The game theoretical model,
once again, explains the need for federal enforcement.
In the context of the dormant Commerce Clause, one can argue
that state policies that threaten to balkanize markets or to otherwise
disrupt the flow of commerce 20 3 justify federal judicial intervention on
the ground that such intervention is welfare enhancing. 20 4 In this
context, however, we are not calling upon the federal judiciary to
effectuate policies associated with the Commerce Clause against
seemingly problematic state laws. Instead, recognizing that the
Commerce Clause is first and foremost a delegation of authority to
Congress, the question is what types of regulatory policies require
centralized coordination for their implementation and enforcement. To
engage in such an analysis, we begin by assuming the objectives of the
selected policy, or perhaps more precisely, leaving challenges to the
substantive merits of the policy to other, more appropriate,
constitutional bases. 20 5 Only then can we evaluate whether the policy
can be implemented in a decentralized fashion or whether, instead, it
requires centralized implementation.

202. For a general analysis of the problem of incommensurability, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994).
203. See Stearns, supra note 146, at 69-117 (identifying coordination games that justify
application of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to strike state laws that undermine political
union among states).
204. For an exception in which a seeming disruption to commerce involving a state
reciprocity law enhances welfare by raising the cost of another state's defection, see Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 27-54 (1984) (demonstrating that in repeated games, tit-for-tat strategy generally
yields highest payoffs); Stearns, supra note 146, at 39-40 and 146-47.
205. See supra note 186, and cite therein (distinguishing due process claims targeting
inefficient or rent-seeking laws from dormant Commerce Clause claims targeting state laws
affecting commerce).
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Some scholars might dispute the wisdom of each of the sets of
policies described thus far-price fixing, labor regulations, and various
environmental controls-or at least the selected level of enforcement
with respect to these policies. But the question as to the wisdom of
these policies, or the appropriate enforcement level, is separate from
the question whether structural impediments reflected in the
prisoners' dilemma prevent the affected firms or states from
implementing the policies absent central coordinated intervention.
The analysis in this Part demonstrates that with respect to these
three sets of policies, the states are in a prisoners' dilemma justifying
federal regulation because the underlying activity has a substantial
economic effect on commerce respecting each policy's implementation.
D. GeographicalBarriersto Interstate Coordination
The final coordination problem implicating Congress's
Commerce Clause power involves a different analytical game.
Successful business ventures often depend upon coordination among
separate political or geographical entities, which operate at the same
20 6
hierarchical level, but which answer to different constituencies.
Interstate railroads require cooperation among states to lay tracks
and to transport cars and materials, and trucks engaged in interstate
20 7 If
shipping require agreements on licensing and regulatory controls.
each state were permitted to depart from generally accepted
requirements governing emissions, permissible truck weight or length,
structural safety features, or even the shape of mud flaps, the
resulting regime would threaten to raise the costs of commerce
sufficiently to turn states into balkanized trade zones.
Notably, such barriers can arise not only in the context of
federal legislation, but also when a single state thwarts a regime
adopted by other states. 208 This helps to explain some of the more
anomalous dormant Commerce Clause cases associated with state

206. For a complementary analysis, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE

127-44 (1993) (explaining various state practices, especially taxation, that can disrupt flow of
interstate business); Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1123-26
(1996) (extending Epstein's analysis to context of cyberspace).
207. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 206, at 161-76 (discussing public roads and
highways).
208. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 677-79 (1981) (striking
state law preventing 65-foot twin trailers, which departed from laws of surrounding states); Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959) (striking state law demanding curved
mudflaps, when most states permitted and one state required straight mudflaps); S. Pac. Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945) (striking state law imposing more severe
constraint on train length than the laws of other states).
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highway safety regulations that, although falling within the
traditional sphere of state police powers, nonetheless thwart a benign
coordinated scheme operating among surrounding states. 20 9 One
unique feature of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is that
unlike most other constitutional rules, Congress can overturn the
Supreme Court's decisions with ordinary legislation. 210 The problem of
interstate coordination provides a simple account of this doctrinal
feature and helps to explain this final category of congressional
211
Commerce Clause powers.
In the context of the dormant Commerce Clause, states
sometimes find themselves in a multiple Nash equilibrium bargaining
game. 212 This game, as illustrated in Table 2, is notably different from
the prisoners' dilemma. The paradigmatic illustration of multiple
Nash equilibria involves driving. As indicated by the difference
between the British and United States driving regimes, a functional
driving infrastructure can operate when vehicles drive either on the
left or on the right side of the road. Neither regime is superior to the
other, but either is superior to the absence of a clear and agreed upon
regime that dictates left or right driving.
Imagine two drivers who have acquired vehicles at the
inception of automobiles, and thus before the imposition of any
regulatory regime governing right or left driving. As shown in Table 2,
the drivers receive a maximum payoff (10, 10) if they agree to a
common driving regime, whether (left, left) or (right, right). In
contrast, if the drivers are unwilling or unable to settle upon a
coordinated driving regime and instead select opposite regimes (left,

209. See Stearns, supra note 146, at 130-33 (explaining cases based upon multiple Nash
equilibrium game).
210. See id. at 133-36 (explaining default nature of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
211. While one professor has recently argued that Congress should not have the power to
overturn the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases, see Norman R. Williams, Why
Congress May Not 'Overrule' the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 CAL. L. REV. 153 (2005), the
argument in the text instead provides a compelling positive account for the default nature of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. For a more detailed analysis, explaining the necessary
default status of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, see Stearns, supra note 146, at 133-36, and
see also infra note 264 and accompanying text.
212. A Nash equilibrium is a solution to a game that results from each player's assessment,
in the absence of any coordination with the other players, of the probable strategy that the other
players will select. See Stearns, supra note 146, at 90 n.266 and accompanying text (discussing
the potential outcomes of situations with multiple Nash equilibria); see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD
ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 22 (1994). In the prisoners' dilemma, as shown in Table 1 at
p.134, there is a single dominant equilibrium outcome, mutual defection, which results from each
player's strategy without regard to the other player's selected strategy. In the game presented in
Table 2 at p.149, in contrast, there is more than a single preferred outcome and, under specified
conditions, there is also the possibility of a suboptimal, mixed strategy equilibrium outcome.
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right or right, left), the result is a "mixed strategy equilibrium," which
yields dramatically lower payoffs (0, 0).
Table 2: Multiple Nash Equilibrium Bargaining Game
Payoffs for (A, B)

A Drives Right

A Drives Left

B Drives Right

(10, 10)

(0, 0)

B Drives Left

(0, 0)

(10, 10)

Whereas the prisoners' dilemma game conduces to a unique
equilibrium outcome of mutual defection, this Nash equilibrium game
instead suggests two preferred equilibrium strategies represented in
the upper left and lower right boxes. If Driver A drives right, then
Driver B can increase her potential payoff from 0 to 10 by also driving
right, and if Driver A drives left, then Driver B can increase her
potential payoff from 0 to 10 by also driving left. The payoffs are
reciprocal and so Driver A has the same incentive to align his strategy
with the strategy selected by Driver B.
This is not to suggest that the preferred arrangement
213
invariably obtains in a multiple Nash equilibrium bargaining game.
If, for example, either driver tried in good faith to anticipate the
other's preferred driving regime but got it wrong, the result would be a
mixed strategy equilibrium with mutually low payoffs and potentially
deadly consequences.
In the context of interstate commerce, most states are also in a
game in which they benefit from common driving regimes. As each
state adopts a particular regime, say driving on the right, the
marginal returns increase as other states follow the same course. 214 In
addition, unlike two drivers simultaneously guessing at each other's
preferences, the probability of absolutely simultaneous decision
making among states is unlikely, and thus the prospect of mixed
strategy equilibrium outcomes is diminished. 215 And yet, states
sometimes enact regulatory policies that thwart commonly accepted
regimes that facilitate the flow of commerce.
213. For a general discussion, see BAIRD ET AL., supra note 212, at 22 (finding that the actors
"might adopt a strategy that is part of a different Nash equilibrium, and the combination of
strategies might not be Nash").
214. For a more detailed discussion, see Stearns, supra note 146, at 112-15.
215. This follows from the assumption that the game is strictly one of coordinated strategies.
If instead, states seek to disrupt the pro-commerce coordinated strategy, non-simultaneity will
not ensure a preferred equilibrium outcome.
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In the driving game, this could arise if one state chose left after
the surrounding states had chosen right.2 16 More typically, the
problem arises when, for example, a group of states permits a certain
rig formation to travel in commerce, but one state in the middle elects
instead to ban it, or when a group of states employs a common
mudflap and one state in the middle instead insists upon an
alternative mudflap. In two such cases, Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp.,21 7 and Bibb v. Illinois,218 the Supreme Court's
decisions to strike state laws that were out of keeping with the
dominant laws of the surrounding states suggest that the defecting
states perceived a benefit from attempting to thwart what would
otherwise have been a simple multiple Nash equilibrium game. 21 9 In
each case, the Court struck down the challenged contrary state law,
evincing a concern that the state enacting or maintaining it was not
motivated by the law's superiority as a safety measure as compared
with those of the surrounding states, but rather was attempting to
secure the benefits of the surrounding states' pro-commerce
220
coordinated activity, without incurring its fair share of the cost.
When an individual state thwarts the dominant regime of the
surrounding states, those burdened by the outlier regime will
sometimes, as in Kassel and Bibb, challenge the minority rule based
upon the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The federal courts have
blunt tools to deal with such cases, allowing them to strike or sustain
the challenged law. 221 In contrast, Congress has more subtle tools at
its disposal. Congress can, for example, implement a new scheme on

216. See Stearns, supra note 146, at 109-12 (presenting path dependent driving game).
217. 450 U.S. 662, 677-79 (1981).
218. 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959).
219. See Stearns, supra note 146, at 130-33 (explaining cases based upon multiple Nash
equilibrium game).
220. In Kassel, most notably, the exceptions to the ban on 65-foot twin trailers strongly
suggested that Iowa benefited from the flow of commerce to Iowa, but elected not to be a thruway
for commerce from point to point outside Iowa. 450 U.S. at 676. This intuition is strengthened by
the Governor's statement in support of his vetoing a bill that would have relaxed restrictions on
the intra-state shipment of mobile homes. Id. at 666 n.6. As Justice Powell, writing for the
plurality explained:
Governor Ray commented, in his veto message: "This bill... would make
Iowa a bridge state as these oversized units are moved into Iowa after being
manufactured in another state and sold in a third. None of this activity would
be of particular economic benefit to Iowa."
Id. at 666 n.7 (quoting Governor Ray, Veto Message (Mar. 16, 1972)).
221. See Stearns, supra note 146, at 133-36 (explaining judicial limitations in dormant
Commerce Clause cases).
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its own or make the minority rule dominant should it find that rule
222
superior.
Congress not only has greater flexibility than does the
Supreme Court in selecting remedies to solve problems of interstate
coordination, but also it has broader flexibility in selecting among
normative objectives associated with the implementation of its
Commerce Clause authority. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court
has allowed Congress, using its Commerce Clause powers, to further
objectives associated with race, and specifically with access to places
of public accommodation. 223 The difficulties in implementing such
policies are similar to those associated with a state thwarting the
benign outcome of a multiple Nash equilibrium game.
Imagine a group of states that permits places of public
accommodation to segregate or to decline service altogether based
upon race. Now imagine that society has decided to implement a
regime change that would prevent this continued set of discriminatory
practices, not only because such discrimination is morally repugnant,
but also to ensure that racial minorities are not inhibited from
engaging in interstate travel by the inconvenience associated with
scarce or shoddy hotel and restaurant accommodations. 224 As in the
prior coordination games, the question arises whether the states,
operating in a decentralized manner, could implement the regime
change, or whether instead, they require Congress, using its central
regulatory enforcement power, to act on their behalf.
Assume that all or almost all of the relevant states agree to the
liberalized public accommodations policy that promotes the ability of
African Americans to travel freely throughout the United States, and
that they have declared illegal any practice that denied access to
places of public accommodation based upon race or ethnicity. The
difficulty is that these state practices are not alone sufficient to ensure
the desired result. Even a single recalcitrant state in the middle of a
group of surrounding states could thwart the scheme by declining to
adopt the liberalized rule, once again explaining the benefits of central
coordination in implementing the desired public accommodations
regime.

222. See id.
223. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964)
(sustaining public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Commerce
Clause challenge as applied to a motel); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964)
(sustaining same provisions against Commerce Clause challenge as applied to a restaurant).
224. For a discussion of congressional findings describing these difficulties, see Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 252-53.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 1:1

The preceding analysis provides insight into the Supreme
Court's recent consolidated decision, Rapanos v. United States, 225 a
case that although implicating the Commerce Clause, was ultimately
22
decided based upon a construction of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 6
Rapanos involved the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers (the
"Corps") to prevent the filling of wetlands as part of its authority with
respect to "navigable waters," defined in the CWA to mean "waters of
the United States." In the Rapanos action, the Corps had construed
"navigable waters" and "waters of the United States," to allow
jurisdiction to deny permits to fill wetlands when "[t]he nearest body
of navigable water was 11 to 20 miles away," and the wetlands were
connected to those waters by a combination of manmade drains, a
creek and a river. 227 In the companion Carabellsaction, the Corps had
construed the same terms to allow jurisdiction to deny permits to fill
wetlands located about one mile from a lake where the wetlands were
separated from the lake by a man-made berm, but occasionally
overflowed into a ditch or drain, which fed into a creek and then into
228
the lake.
Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of four, claimed that to
avoid a potentially unconstitutional expansion of Commerce Clause
229
powers, it was necessary to rely upon the clear statement rule.
Applying that rule, Scalia determined that the CWA only conferred
jurisdiction over wetlands when two conditions were met: "First, that
the adjacent channel contains a 'water of the United States,' (i.e., a
relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate
navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous
225. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
226. See supra note 21 (discussing application of doctrine of constitutional avoidance to
Rapanos).
227. 126 S.Ct. at 2214-15 (plurality opinion). As Justice Scalia explained:
The wetlands at the Salzburg site are connected to a man-made drain, which
drains into the Hoppler Creek, which flows into the Kawkawlin River, which
empties into Saginaw Bay and Lake Huron ....The Wetlands at the Hines
Road site are connected to something called the "Rose Drain," which has a
surface connection to the Tittabawassee River .... And the Wetlands at the

Pine River site have a surface connection to the Pine River, which flows into
Lake Huron.
Id. at 2219.
228. Id. at 2214-15, 2219.
229. The clear statement rule requires a 'clear and manifest' statement from Congress to
authorize an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority." Id. at 2224. For an article
claiming that the Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause decisions, including Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), and Rapanos, 126 S. Ct.
2208, and its spending decision, Arlington Central School District v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455,
2463-64 (2006), have not succeeded in revitalizing the clear statement rule, see generally Somin,
supra note 42.
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surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine
where the 'water' ends an the 'wetland' begins." 230 Justice Kennedy,
concurring in the judgment on narrower grounds, 231 instead offered a
broader construction of the CWA. Kennedy would allow the Corps to
exercise jurisdiction over wetlands when there is a "significant nexus
between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the
traditional sense,"232 an issue to be determined on a case-by-case

basis. Writing the principal dissent, Justice Stevens rejected the
constructions offered by both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy,
claiming that neither afforded appropriate agency deference under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,233 and
that governing precedents were sufficiently broad to sustain the
jurisdiction in both cases. 234 While Rapanos raises issues of statutory
construction and agency deference that extend beyond the scope of
this Article, assuming that a fair construction of the CSA authorizes
the exercise of jurisdiction over the relevant wetlands, this Article's
analysis suggests a normative basis for sustaining that result against
a Commerce Clause challenge.

230. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2227 (plurality opinion).
231. See id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (lamenting need to apply narrowest ground
doctrine due to the lack of a majority opinion); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
193-94 (1977) (setting out narrowest grounds doctrine); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for
Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of ConstitutionalLaw, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321,
322 (2000) (explaining importance of narrowest grounds rule in reading and in appreciating the
dynamics that give rise to fractured Supreme Court decisions).
232. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Kennedy
added:
[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus and thus come within the statutory
phrase "navigable waters," if the wetlands, either alone or in combination
with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily
understood as "navigable." When, in contrast, wetlands' effects on water
quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly
encompassed by the statutory term "navigable waters."
Id.
233. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
234. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The major precedents were United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), and Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), 531 U.S. 159 (2001). In
RiversideBayview Homes, Inc., the Court construed the same provisions of the CSA to permit the
Corps to prevent discharge of fill into wetlands adjacent to a navigable creek. 474 U.S. at 131,
139; see also Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In SWANCC, the Court
rejected the application of the Corps' Migratory Bird Rule as the basis for jurisdiction respecting
abandoned sand and gravel pit mining operations that "evolved into a scattering of permanent
and seasonal ponds," 531 U.S. at 163, which migratory birds used as habitats, because the ponds
were "not part of a tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the United
States, the degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce." Id. at 168-69
(quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(5) (1978)).
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As Justice Kennedy observed in his separate opinion, even
without resorting to the Wickard multiplier analysis, 235 the states
themselves identified a significant structural impediment to
safeguarding wetlands that ultimately feed into navigable waters
within their borders. Thirty-three states plus the District of Columbia
submitted an amici brief on behalf of the government, maintaining
that the Corps' broad reading of the term "navigable waters" in the
CSA "protects downstream States from out-of-state pollution that they
cannot themselves regulate." 236 If we accept the policy of preserving
wetlands to provide, among other benefits, protection of waters of the
United States against pollutants, 237 the preceding analysis
demonstrates the need for imposed multi-state cooperation to enforce
the scheme. Because navigable waters, like railroads and interstate
highways, flow through multiple states, and because, as the two
Rapanos actions well illustrate, wetlands preservation imposes
considerable costs upon potential land developers, 238 rational states
are prone to obstructing coordinated strategies to protect wetlands
affecting waters of the United States. 239 While Justice Scalia
suggested that state support for the Corps' actions in Rapanos was
motivated by the desire to pass political responsibility onto the federal
government for costly regulatory actions, 240 this Article's game
theoretical analysis suggests a more generous account. The states
supported the Corps' regulatory restrictions because if left to state
level enforcement, the states themselves would have confronted a
potentially insurmountable structural impediment to implementing
the wetlands preservation regime.

235. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2246 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
236. Id.
237. Among the benefits identified by the government's expert witness at the Rapanos trial
were "habitat, sediment trapping, nutrient recycling, and flood peak diminution." Id. at 2253-54
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of Dr. Daniel Willard).
238. For a discussion of the thwarted development projects at issue in the Rapanos cases, see
id. at 2214 (plurality opinion); id. at 2253 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the Rapanos'
defiance of orders safeguarding wetlands on their properties and resulting prosecutions).
239. Alternatively, one might view this as a multilateral prisoners' dilemma respecting
wetlands preservation. Individual states seeking the benefits of a program of wetlands
preservation will prefer to limit the obligations they impose on their in-state developers, while
hoping that adjoining states enforce wetlands regulations more zealously. See generally supra
Part II.C (describing prisoners' dilemma respecting environmental regulation).
240. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224 n.8 (plurality opinion) ("Legislative and executive
officers of the States may be content to leave 'responsibilit[y]' with the Corps because it is
attractive to shift to another entity controversial decisions disputed between politically powerful,
rival interests." (alteration in original)).
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E. Policies Not Requiring Central CoordinatedIntervention

We have now applied two coordination games to four
paradigmatic cases that require federal intervention to implement a
desired policy affecting interstate commerce. Completing the model,
however, requires a final step. We need to identify a paradigm case
that implicates neither model and that fits none of the four paradigms
requiring coordinated central intervention to facilitate the desired
policy.
Let us reconsider United States v. Lopez. 24 1 In Lopez, the
Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act. 242 The
statute prohibited persons from carrying or using weapons within a
1000 foot radius of a school. 243 Certainly the policy is normatively
appealing. Few would argue against banning the carrying and use of
guns near schools. 244 As before, however, the question is not the
wisdom of the selected policy; rather, it is whether implementing the
policy requires central coordination. And here the answer is no.
To understand why, imagine that State A elects to enact a
similar law that prohibits the possession and use of guns within a
specified radius of its schools. The question is whether the decision of
neighboring State B not to enact the same law undermines the
selected policy in state A. If instead, State B targets the offensive
conduct without classifying gun-related crimes committed on school
property as a separate offense, but rather by enhancing penalties for
any crime with or without a gun committed on school premises, this
would have no effect on the particular method of targeting the same
conduct in State A. Indeed, if State B treated gun-related crimes on
school grounds no differently than other gun-related crimes committed
elsewhere, that would have no effect on the policy selected in State A.

241. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
242. Id. at 551.
243. Id. at n.1.
244. Few but not none. See John R. Lott, Jr., Editorial, The Real Lesson of the School
Shootings, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1998, at A14 (arguing that allowing law-abiding adults to carry
guns in public schools potentially protects students from on-campus violence). More recently,
Lott has been joined by at least one conservative online commentator who, in the aftermath of
the recent and tragic school shooting in the Amish community, has posited a linkage between
such zones and recent school shootings. See, e.g., Alan Gottlieb & Dave Workman, Gun-Free
Schools Imperil Students, PRESS REPUBLICAN, Oct. 8, 2006, http://www.pressrepublican.com
apps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID=/20061008/OPINION610070310; See also Amy Worden & Mario F.
Cattabiani, Shootings overshadow crime session, Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 4, 2006, at A15
(quoting Pennsylvania Governor Edward Rendell as stating: "I believe with all my heart that we
need more gun control ....[and that] "You can make all the changes you want, but you can never
stop a random act of violence by someone intent on taking his own life.").
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There is no prisoners' dilemma game that would result in
States A and B defecting from a regime in which, through whatever
means they happen to prefer, the states punish various crimes on
school grounds. And the decision of State B to select a different means
of targeting that conduct, or even to decline to target the conduct
separately, in no sense blocks any geographically coordinated procommerce strategy among states. In short, Lopez implicates neither
model justifying the use of central authority to ensure that the
selected policy is not undermined by the decisions of states as a whole
to defect or by the decisions of a single state to undermine the selected
coordinated strategy.
We have now completed the analytical model with respect to
the Supreme Court's major Commerce Clause cases, including the
most recent precedent, Gonzales v. Raich. The discussion
demonstrates the power of game theoretical analysis to reconcile the
major post-New Deal expansion of Commerce Clause power with the
retrenchments represented in Lopez and Morrison. I do not wish to
suggest that there are no hard cases arising under the Commerce
Clause. 245 But addressing even the most difficult Commerce Clause
cases is easier if the Court's analysis is informed by a better set of
analytical tools.246
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES
In this Part, we will briefly consider several prominent
Commerce Clause cases that help test the coordination theory of
Congress's Commerce Clause power described in Part II. While the
review is not comprehensive, together with the cases used to develop
the model in Part II, the discussion provides the basis for assessing
the game theoretical model of the Commerce Clause, including
24 7
completing the analysis of Gonzales v. Raich.

245. As demonstrated infra Parts III.B.3 and III.B.4.a, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000), and Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), are potentially difficult cases under
the analysis presented in this Article.
246. Readers familiar with Commerce Clause doctrine should have little difficulty fitting
other cases into the model.
247. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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A. A Comment on the Least ControversialCommerce Clause
Categories: Channels of Interstate Commerce, and Instrumentalities,
and Persons and Things Traveling in Interstate Commerce
While this Article has focused primarily on the substantial
effects category of Congress's Commerce Clause power, which
encompasses Wickard, Lopez, Morrison, and most recently Raich, the
game theoretical model developed in Part II helps to assess the scope
of Congress's Commerce Clause power more broadly. As a result, it is
important to consider, in light of that model, the remaining, and less
controversial, doctrinal categories.
To assess Congress's power to regulate the channels of
interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
and persons and things traveling in interstate commerce, it is helpful
to relate those doctrinal categories to the dormant side of the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Although not without
exception, 248 the dormant Commerce Clause cases generally involve
state laws that infringe on commerce by closing access to interstate
commerce directly, 249 for example by granting an exclusive license to
use a channel of interstate commerce to the exclusion of potential
interstate competitors, 250 or indirectly, by imposing restrictions on
permissible instrumentalities of commerce that are out of keeping
251
with the general requirements accepted in other states.
248. Consider, for example, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 119-21
(1978), which sustained a state law that prohibited producers or refiners of gasoline from owning
service stations in Maryland, and which did not involve a regulation of channels,
instrumentalities, or persons or things in interstate commerce.
249. While Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), which involved Congress's power
to grant a license over navigable waters that conflicted with an exclusive license granted by the
State of New York, was decided on the Commerce Clause rather than the dormant Commerce
Clause, see id. at 221-22, as demonstrated below, the case nonetheless provides the paradigm for
dormant Commerce Clause analysis. It is important to recognize that not all state laws that
regulate channels of interstate commerce violate the Commerce Clause operating in its dormant
capacity. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 250-52 (1829)
(holding that a dam authorized under state law on a creek flowing into the Delaware River that
was injured by a federally licensed sloop did not violate the Commerce Clause and thus the
Commerce Clause did not provide a defense to the owner of the sloop).
250. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 212-13.
251. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 677-79 (1981) (striking
down Iowa ban on 65-foot twin trailers, when such trailers were permitted in surrounding
states); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959) (striking down Illinois
requirement of curved mudflaps when forty-five other states permitted straight mudflaps and
one other state banned curved mudflaps); see also Brannon P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce
Clause Doctrine and Constitutional Structure 20 (Feb. 19, 2001) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=260830 (observing that "most...
[dormant Commerce Clause] cases involve conduct that, were it regulated by Congress, would be
considered regulation of either the channels of interstate commerce (and things or persons
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The doctrinal connection between the two sides of the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which affords Congress the
power to regulate in areas where states have traditionally interfered
with commerce, should not be surprising. Among the principal
objectives animating the Commerce Clause, and indeed animating the
replacement of the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution
itself, was preventing state laws that undermine the concept of
political union among states. 252 Whether the vehicle for implementing
this objective is a judicial decision that invalidates a challenged state
law alleged to infringe on commerce or a congressional statute that
ensures a uniform policy with respect to that subject area, the effect is
to ensure that the difficulties associated with decentralized decision
making among individual states do not thwart the framers' desired
objective of unifying the United States into a single entity with respect
to commerce by instead allowing them to fracture into balkanized
253
trade zones.
moving therein) or of instrumentalitiesof interstate commerce-the least controversial of Lopez's
taxonomy of congressional commerce clause power").
252. Some scholars have maintained that the Commerce Clause was designed to promote
political union and thus to inhibit discriminatory state laws that might generate a retaliatory
response. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1988)
("[T]he negative implications of the commerce clause derive principally from a political theory of
union, not from an economic theory of free trade. The function of the clause is to ensure national
solidarity, not economic efficiency."). Others have instead focused on the role of the Commerce
Clause in promoting economic union characterized by specialization and exchange. See, e.g.,
Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089,
1109 (1997) ("[T]he Court has linked much of its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to its
assertion that one of the animating principles of the Constitution is economic union, which would
be frustrated if states could enact discriminatory or protectionist legislation aimed at out-of-state
commerce."). My own position is that because the Commerce Clause condones a variety of
welfare-reducing, rent-seeking laws, while targeting laws that undermine coordinated procommerce strategies, the clause is best understood as promoting political, rather than economic,
union. See Stearns, supranote 146, at 8-9 n.13.
253. While the framing generation could not have couched their arguments in game
theoretical terms, some members were well aware of coordination difficulties associated with
continuing to rest regulatory power over matters of trade and commerce with the States. For an
informative illustration, consider James Madison's August 7, 1785 letter, in which he forcefully
expresses such concerns to James Monroe. See Letter from James Madison to James Monroe
(Aug. 7, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, MAR. 10, 1784-MAR. 28, 1786, at 333-36
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). Madison observed:
If it be necessary to regulate trade at all, it surely is necessary to lodge the
power, where trade can be regulated with effect, and experience has
confirmed what reason foresaw, that it can never be so regulated by the
States acting in their separate capacities. They can no more exercise this
power separately, than they could separately carry on war, or separately form
treaties of alliance or Commerce.
Id. at 333. He goes on to explain that "harmony" can only be achieved in a regime demanding "an
acquiescence of all the States in the opinion of a reasonable majority." Id. at 334. He then
describes the conceptual difficulty in allowing "seven or eight of the States [to] be hindered by
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It should not be surprising, therefore, that the facts underlying
Gibbons v. Ogden,254 the landmark Supreme Court case concerning the
scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power, implicate both the
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. New York had
granted an exclusive license to Fulton and Livingston, who granted it
to Ogden, to operate a steamboat ferry between New York City and
Elizabethtown, New Jersey. 255 Gibbons operated a competing ferry
pursuant to a federal law authorizing him to operate a vessel in the
"coasting trade." 25 6 While Gibbons's ferry, an instrumentality of
commerce, operated pursuant to a federal statute, the exclusive New
York license under which Ogden operated effectively blocked a
channel of interstate commerce.
In sustaining the federal law, and thus the scope of Congress's
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court
recognized, at least implicitly, the risks associated with decentralized
regulation of the channels of interstate commerce. 257 If Congress were
not permitted to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, and
thus to remove geographical obstructions to the flow of interstate
commerce, then open channels of commerce would depend entirely
upon the fortuity of coordinated state laws, which as Gibbons itself
illustrated, was not always forthcoming.
Cases
involving
the
regulation
of
channels
and
instrumentalities of commerce are easily explained based upon the
intuition that underlies the multiple Nash equilibrium game. Allowing
states to enact laws that undermine geographical coordination among
states would obviously prevent the flow of commerce among states. In
such dormant Commerce Clause cases as Kassel and Bibb, individual
state defection from a coordinated pro-commerce regime arises simply
by the decision of a single state to enact or maintain a law contrary to
the others from obtaining relief by federal means" respecting, for example, trade restrictions
imposed by Great Britain. Id. at 334-35.
254. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 35-36 (statement of Appellant Gibbons).
255. Id. at 8-9.
256. Id. at 211-12 (majority opinion).
257. Justice Johnson, who concurred separately, made the connection more explicit:
If there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the
constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free
from all invidious and partial restraints. And I cannot overcome the
conviction, that if the [federal] licensing act was repealed tomorrow,
[Gibbons's right] to a reversal ... would be as strong as it is under this
license. One half the doubts in life arise from the defects of language, and if
this instrument [meaning Ogden's New York license] had been called an
exemption instead of a license, it would have given a better idea of its
character.
Id. at 231-32 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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that in surrounding states, even if that law is not the product of a
superior policy. While Kassel and Bibb arose on the dormant side of
the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the clause itself
is a delegation of regulatory power to Congress.
Congress's power with respect to the Commerce Clause
surpasses that of the federal judiciary in several significant respects.
Congress need not await a case presenting a challenge to a nonconforming law. 258 It can instead anticipate a potential conflict by
electing to regulate channels or instrumentalities of commerce
directly. And when the Supreme Court, for example, strikes a state
law down under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, Congress
can supersede that ruling through ordinary legislation that either
facilitates a mixed strategy equilibrium, thus permitting states to
embrace different regimes, 259 or by making the rejected minority
260
position mandatory among states.
The multiple Nash equilibrium bargaining model also explains
why, unlike with constitutional rulings generally, Congress can
override dormant Commerce Clause decisions through ordinary
legislation. 261 Most state laws that result in coordinated pro-commerce
strategies are not enacted simultaneously. States enact laws aware of
how they will relate to those of surrounding states. The consequence of
sequential decision making, however, is to render state laws
dependent upon the order or path of state decision making. 262 The
resulting path dependence implies that the laws selected in the
earliest moving states have an advantage relative to contrary laws
263
enacted later in other states.
Because state laws affecting commerce are potentially prone to
path dependence, there is a risk that the regime that emerges as
dominant, even if once viewed as a pure matter of interstate
coordination, produced a policy that over time proved inferior to an

258. For a discussion of how standing doctrine affects the timing of judicial versus legislative
decision making, see Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and
Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1319 (1995).
259. For a discussion of an example in which Congress modified a Supreme Court dormant
Commerce Clause ruling, thus facilitating potential mixed strategy equilibria, see Stearns, supra
note 146, at 135 n.362.
260. See id. at 133-36 (discussing the power of Congress to adopt the rejected minority
position).
261. See id.
262. See id. at 112-15 (explaining that as more states enact similar pro-commerce strategies,
marginal returns are increasing due to path dependence).
263. See id.

20071

NEW COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE

available alternative regime. 264 If the Supreme Court's dormant
Commerce Clause rulings were like ordinary constitutional rulings,
requiring a constitutional amendment or overruling to replace, then
the result would be to entrench regulatory regimes that are the
product of fortuitous timing among individual states rather than an
assessment of their merit as compared with other potential regimes.
We have now demonstrated how the coordination analysis in
Part II explains the easiest categories of Commerce Clause cases. We
now turn to the final and most controversial category in which
Congress regulates local activity that exhibits a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
B. Substantial Effects Cases
This final category has been most recently transformed as part
of the Supreme Court's new Commerce Clause doctrine and is critical
to assessing the major cases under review, Wickard, Lopez, and Raich.
Most recently, the Raich Court relied upon the revised doctrine to
sustain the application of the CSA to respondents' activities in
producing, acquiring, and using medical marijuana. Because the
Raich Court determined that Wickard, a case implicating the cartel
game, was strikingly similar, and ultimately controlling, we will leave
that paradigm until the end. We will now employ the game theoretical
analysis of the Commerce Clause developed in the prior part to
consider several major cases and doctrinal categories that justify
coordinated federal intervention.
1. Wage and Hour Regulations
The landmark New Deal legislation did not regulate channels
or instrumentalities of commerce, but rather regulated conditions of
employment directly or things traveling in commerce as an indirect
means of regulating conditions of employment. As a result, to sustain
such regulation, the Supreme Court needed a new paradigm for
evaluating the permissible scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
powers. Such regulations took various forms. The National Labor
Relations Act "(NLRA"), 265 sustained in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,266 created a comprehensive regime governing labormanagement relations, including the right of employees to organize
264. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 134-36 (linking the power of Congress to
overturn dormant Commerce Clause rulings to path dependence).
265. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1935).
266. 301 U.S. 1, 46-49 (1937).
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and bargain collectively. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 267 sustained
in United States v. Darby,268 prohibited the interstate shipment of
goods that were manufactured by employees who earned below the
specified minimum wage or who worked beyond the specified
269
maximum number of hours.
As before, the issue considered here is not the normative merit
of collective bargaining agreements or of minimum wage or maximum
hour laws. Instead, the question is whether the Supreme Court
decisions sustaining these labor laws are consistent with the insight
that the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power is linked to the
need for a central coordinating authority to implement selected
regulatory schemes. In these two cases, the answer is yes.
Darby follows simply from the model presented in Part II.B.
Firms and states confront a prisoners' dilemma in seeking to
implement minimum wage or maximum hours schemes, thus
requiring a centrally imposed federal solution. The more difficult case
is Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. Collective bargaining allows
employees to cartelize their wages, thus setting a rate that exceeds
what they would obtain under ordinary market conditions.2 7 0 While
the results of individual collective bargaining contracts will not be
uniform among firms subject to the NLRA, states remain in a
prisoners' dilemma in seeking to implement a policy that facilitates
collective bargaining. From the perspective of individual firms,
operating in a collective bargaining environment imposes higher labor
costs relative to firms not subject to such requirements. It is therefore
rational for each firm or state to prefer imposing the burden of
collective bargaining on other firms or states while declining to impose
the obligation on themselves. It is not surprising therefore that the
regime facilitating collective bargaining arises at the federal, rather
271
than state, level.
267. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1938).
268. 312 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1941). Darby overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251, 28081 (1918), which held that a federal statute setting working conditions for children was beyond
the permissible scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power on the ground that manufacturing
precedes commerce. As previously explained, rather than establishing that production is
commerce, these cases rejected the very temporal formalism embraced in this earlier era.
269. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 121. As stated in the text, the statute regulated things traveling
in interstate commerce as a backdoor mechanism for regulating working conditions. See id. at
121-26. The argument in the text provides a more direct foundation for Congress's power to
address the underlying regulatory objective under the Commerce Clause. See id.
270. See Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1005-06
(1986) (describing unions as monopolists); Richard Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 988, 990 (1984) (describing unions as labor cartels).
271. In addition, each state has both management and labor interests and the political
results of their lobbying efforts might not produce consistent outcomes in protecting the rights of
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2. Environmental Coordination

The model in Part II explained the need for central
coordination in environmental conservation policies. In this Part, we
focus on a discrete aspect of environmental coordination, namely
waste disposal. This area of law is important not only because it is
ubiquitous, 272 but also because it shows that superadditive gains can
arise with moves either in the direction of central or decentralized
decision making. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not
facilitated an optimal set of doctrines to encourage the creation of
much needed waste disposal facilities because it has treated waste in
much the same manner as other categories of commerce without
considering which regime produces the largest superadditive gains. To
understand the coordination problem that arises in the context of
waste disposal, it is helpful to contrast two cases, one arising on each
side of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,273 the Supreme Court
struck down a New Jersey statute that banned the import of solid or
liquid waste originating from out of state. 2 74 After determining that,
its negative value notwithstanding, waste was an article in
commerce, 275 the Court determined that states could not discriminate
against waste originating from other states in an effort to prolong the
life of their landfills. 276 The Court determined that states could further
their environmental interests, or even their residents' financial
interests implicated by the threat of closing their waste disposal
278
facilities, 277 but only through commerce-neutral means.
As then-Associate Justice Rehnquist observed in a dissenting
opinion, the difficulty with the City of Philadelphiaruling is that it
imposes a Hobson's choice upon states, which must either regulate
waste commerce neutrally or not at all. 279 One might respond that
imposing such a choice is the very point of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. But consider whether in this context an insistently
labor to bargain collectively. This further underscores the need for a federal regulatory solution
to impose the policy in a uniform manner.
272. See SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1995) (lamenting that
the federal judicial docket is "clogged with ... garbage").
273. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
274 Id. at 618, 629.
275. Id. at 622.
276. Id. at 625-27.
277. Id. at 626.
278. See id. ("New Jersey may pursue... [its] ends by slowing the flow of all waste into the
State's remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected.").
279. See id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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commerce-neutral regime is necessarily welfare-enhancing. By
preventing states from capturing the benefit of their own waste
disposal, states lose the incentive to grant the necessary permits to
facilitate the creation of waste disposal facilities. 2 0 In a perfect world,
Philadelphia, because it is across the river from New Jersey, would be
permitted to dispose of its waste at an appropriate site in southern
New Jersey if doing so was less costly than disposing of its waste at a
more distant site in Pennsylvania. But for this first-best solution to
work, New Jersey must be motivated to facilitate the creation of the
needed waste outlet. If the choice is a shortage of facilities, but
treating waste from Philadelphia the same as waste from Camden,
versus encouraging the creation of facilities, but forcing waste from
Philadelphia to travel a greater distance within Pennsylvania, the
latter option might well be superior. While this, of course, is a secondbest theory, comparative institutional analysis depends upon avoiding
28 1
the critical error of making the perfect the enemy of the good.
Another option, of course, would be to have Congress direct
states to create needed waste disposal facilities. This implicates the
scope of Congress's Commerce Clause powers and, once again, the
Supreme Court has failed adequately to consider the relative merit of
two admittedly imperfect alternative regimes. In the context of lowlevel radioactive waste, the Supreme Court has relied upon the anticommandeering doctrine to prevent Congress from insisting that
states create the needed disposal facilities. In New York v. United
States,28 2 the Supreme Court struck down the take-title provisions of
the Low-Level Waste Policy Amendments of 1985.283 The complicated
statutory scheme contained a series of incentives designed to motivate
states to develop a coordinated solution to the looming crisis
concerning disposal of low-level radioactive waste. 28 4 While the United
States once had three disposal facilities, at the time that the
amendments were enacted, there was only a single facility, and the
Governor of South Carolina, where the site was located, had
28 5
threatened to reduce intake by fifty percent.

280. See Stearns, supra note 146, at 88.
281. For a general discussion of the nirvana fallacy in economics, see Stearns, supra note
164, at 1230 n.33, and cites therein.
282. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
283 Id. at 187-88.
284. For a more detailed discussion of New York v. United States, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING

58-63 (paperback ed. 2002).
285. See New York, 505 U.S. at 150.
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The federal scheme, which required that each state become self
sufficient in low-level waste management by either creating its own
disposal facility or by joining a regional pact with other states,
contained three sets of incentives. 28 6 Only the third, the take-title
28 7
provision, created a Commerce Clause problem.
The take-title provision demanded non-complying states to
either take title to their producers' waste or reimburse producers for
their failure to do so. 28 8 The Court struck this down on the ground that
Congress lacks the power to commandeer state legislatures by forcing
the legislatures to pass laws that implement Congress's chosen
regulatory policy, as opposed to Congress directly regulating private
entities. 28 9 The purpose here is not to evaluate the merits of the
Court's historical argument that the Constitution prevents Congress
from commandeering state legislatures. 290 Rather, it is to demonstrate
that the Court has thwarted two possible second-best regimes, either
of which would suffice to facilitate the development of a pro-commerce
strategy respecting waste disposal. First, the Court could allow states
to balkanize, thus encouraging states to become self sufficient by
letting them capture the benefit of their approved facilities. Or second,
if the Court insists as part of its dormant Commerce Clause analysis
upon commerce-neutral state waste regulation, it can afford Congress
the flexibility denied under the anti-commandeering doctrine to coerce
states as needed to force the creation of waste disposal facilities when
29 1
allowing discrimination in commerce is not alone sufficient.
286. Id. at 151-53.
287. The first incentive allowed states that had developed such facilities, or that joined pacts
with other states containing such facilities, to discriminate in the intake of waste against those
that did not by imposing surcharges and sending the proceeds to the Secretary of the Treasury,
who would then send rebates to complying states. Id. at 152-53. The Court upheld this combined
incentive on the grounds that Congress can authorize the states to burden commerce, the federal
government can tax commerce, and Congress can use its spending power to reward complying
states. Id. at 171-72. The second incentive allowed complying states to limit access to their
disposal facilities by noncomplying, nonmember states. Id. at 153. The Court sustained this
incentive on the ground that Congress had authorized states and regional compacts to
discriminate in commerce. Id. at 173.
288. Id. at 153-54.
289. See id. at 175-77.
290. For an argument that Justice O'Connor's historical account goes to the propriety, rather
than to the constitutionality of commandeering, see Erik M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin,
Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and the Federal Requisition Power: New York v. United
States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 355 (1998).
291. The New York case demonstrated the insufficiency because New York, the only
remaining state not to create an in-state outlet or to join a regional pact, was not motivated to
become self-sufficient even in a regime allowing self-sufficient states or states in a regional pact
to discriminate against waste in commerce. See 505 U.S. at 154-55 (describing New York's
decision to comply with the Low-Level Waste Policy Act by enacting legislation that provided for
the creation of a site).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1:1

The point of this discussion is to emphasize that coordination
difficulties implicate both sides of the Commerce Clause doctrine.
This Article has focused on games affecting the affirmative side of
Commerce Clause doctrine. If the Roberts Court is going to reevaluate
longstanding premises affecting its interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, however, it is also important to consider the judicially crafted
anti-commandeering doctrine, which might fail properly to account for
the structural relationship between the affirmative and dormant sides
of the Supreme Court's overall Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
3. Geographic coordination
The most recent major case testing Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause to further the goal of geographic coordination is
United States v. Morrison,292 the second case after Lopez to strike a
federal statute under the non-economic activities test. Because this
case bears some similarities to two prominent civil rights cases, Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,293 and Katzenbach v.
McClung,294 it is important to compare these cases.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Supreme Court upheld the
application of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964295 to a motel located in Atlanta, Georgia that was readily
accessible to two interstate and two state highways that advertised on
billboards along those highways, and that did seventy-five percent of
its business with out-of-state guests. 296 In the companion case,
Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court denied a request to enjoin the
application of the same statute to Ollie's Barbeque, a family owned
restaurant located in Birmingham, Alabama, 29 7 that received in one
year about $150,000 in food from a vendor who purchased a
substantial portion in interstate commerce, and that was located
298
eleven blocks from an interstate highway.
To avoid the state action requirement under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court rested its rulings sustaining both
laws on the Commerce Clause. 299 Thus, the issue in these cases was
292. 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000).
293. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
294. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
295. The public accommodations provisions were set out in Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to §
2000a-6 (2000).
296. Heartof Atlanta Hotel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 243.
297. Id. at 296.
298. See id.
299. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from denying due process or
equal protection and § 5 provides Congress with the power to enforce the substantive provisions
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whether Congress could rely upon its Commerce Clause power to
prohibit private persons who owned or operated places of public
accommodation from engaging in various forms of racial
discrimination. In both cases, Justice Clark, writing for a majority,
noted the serious difficulties that African Americans traveling in the
South had confronted as a result of discriminatory practices. 300 And
yet, in both cases, Justice Clark justified Congress's exercise of
Commerce Clause power on the proximity to channels of interstate
commerce or on the likely linkage to persons or goods traveling in
commerce. Thus, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Clark focused on the
proximity of the motel to interstate highways, 30 1 and in Katzenbach,
Clark focused on the wholesale vendor's purchase of interstate
30 2
supplies.
The coordination game presented in Part II provides a more
intuitive linkage from the regulated activity and the objectives of
interstate commerce than the fortuity that the particular place of
public accommodation was located near a highway or purchased
supplies beyond some minimal threshold level that traveled in
interstate commerce. To implement Congress's desired federal scheme
effectuating the ability of persons to travel in commerce without
regard to race, it was essential to do so centrally. In Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Justice Clark noted that thirty-two states had public
accommodations laws similar to that at issue in the case. 30 3 While the
states that failed to afford such protections were generally
geographically contained, Congress could intuit that the ability to
liberalize this policy and thus to ensure free travel by African
Americans throughout the United States depended on the willingness
of individual states to regulate resistant places of public
accommodation. The inability to rely upon states to ensure this result
(eighteen states did not go along), certainly justifies the need for
central coordinated intervention.
Once we recognize the policy of ensuring free travel, including
access to places of public accommodation without regard to race, we
in § 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. The public accommodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in contrast, regulated private firms, thus making reliance upon Congress's §
5 enforcement power problematic. Accord William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretationof the
Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather
than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1116 n.317 (1983).

300. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 252-53 (describing congressional findings
concerning difficulties African Americans have confronted due to discrimination during
interstate travel); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299-300 (same).
301. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 255-58.
302. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 297-304.
303. 379 U.S. at 260.
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can see that even a single recalcitrant state, or a group of such states,
could inhibit the implementation of that policy by other states. The
analytical problem justifying central coordination is in effect the same
as when a single state blocks commerce in a multiple Nash
equilibrium game by enacting a law that thwarts the dominant regime
in surrounding states.
In United States v. Morrison,30 4 the most recent case striking
down an exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power, the Supreme
Court invalidated the civil remedies provision for violent genderrelated crimes in the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") 30 5 as a
Commerce Clause violation. 306 The Morrison Court applied the Lopez
non-economic activities test to hold that violence against women was
not an economic activity, and thus did not qualify under the
30 7
substantial effects test for congressional Commerce Clause powers.
As in Heart of Atlanta Hotel and Katzenbach, Morrison did not
involve the regulation of persons traveling in interstate commerce
directly. Certainly no state banned women, or women from other
states, from traveling within their borders. The question instead was
whether Congress could effect a supplemental federal civil remedy for
what was already a state law crime in virtually every jurisdiction
when that criminal activity was gender motivated. Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected a line of reasoning, based upon congressional
findings that linked the burdens of gender-motivated violence to a
304. 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000).
305. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
306. In Morrison, Petitioner Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute
("VPI") claimed to have been raped by two VPI students, Antonio Morrison and James Crawford.
529 U.S. at 602. After an investigation, the school determined that the evidence against
Crawford was insufficient, but found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for
two semesters. Id. at 603. Morrison challenged this result under VPI's Sexual Assault Policy, but
the second hearing produced the same result. Id. Brzonkala then sued VPI, Morrison, and
Crawford in federal court under VAWA, claiming that the school's handling of her complaint
violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and that Morrison's attack provided a
basis for relief under § 13981. Id. at 604. The district court dismissed the suit against VPI,
finding it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and found that while the suit
against Morrison and Crawford stated a claim, VAWA exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause
powers. Id. After a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed and reinstated both claims, id., the Fourth Circuit, acting as an en banc court, affirmed
the district court's determination that Brzonkala had stated a claim under § 13981, but also
affirmed the district court determination that the statute exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause
powers. Id. at 604-05.
307. See id. at 617-18. The Court did not disturb the part of VAWA creating a federal
criminal remedy against gender-motivated crime, which fell within the first of the three Lopez
categories because it regulated the use of channels of interstate commerce while seeking to
engage in specified criminal activity. See id. at 613 n.5 (explaining that the Courts of Appeals
have uniformly upheld the criminal counterpart to the civil remedy struck down in Morrison, set
out in 42 U.S.C. § 40221(a)).
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diminution in travel, to a reduction in business, and to an effect on
interstate commercial activity. 308 Rehnquist determined that taking
this but-for causal reasoning to its logical extreme would allow
Congress to regulate in such traditional state areas as family law,
30 9
marriage, divorce, and childrearing.
At one level, Morrison appears to implicate the structural
issues associated with geographical coordination raised in Heart of
Atlanta Hotel and Katzenbach. If states had not uniformly
criminalized and enforced laws against gender motivated crime, the
result could be balkanized travel in which women based their
decisions on the criminal statutes of individual states. Even if all
states agreed to the policy of ensuring free travel without regard to
gender, in theory, effectuating the policy might require uniform
implementation because of the threat that one state could reverse
course. But in this case, it appears that the Supreme Court found this
insufficiently plausible to justify the challenged provisions in VAWA.
The Court apparently intuited instead that the historical context of
state laws that resulted in impediments to interstate travel by African
Americans did not have a strong analogue with respect to gender. This
is an admittedly hard case because the game theoretical intuitions
affecting African Americans and women are similar, even if the Court
intuited that the historical records concerning the specific question of
burdens on interstate travel justified different results.
4. Noncoordination cases
Before proceeding to Raich, we will consider one final, and also
difficult, case. In Perez v. United States,3 10 the Supreme Court
sustained the exercise of Commerce Clause power,3 11 but in a context
in which the coordination analysis makes this determination at least
potentially problematic. After Perez, we will revisit Raich, in light of
the preceding analysis, which demonstrates why preventing the stateapproved use of medical marijuana was not justified to effectuate a
coordinated federal regulatory scheme.
a. Perez
In Perez, the Supreme Court sustained the application of Title
II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which prohibited, among
308. See id. at 615.
309. See id. at 615-16.
310. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
311 Id. at 146-47.
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other activities, "extortionate credit transactions, '1 2 against a man
convicted of loan sharking in connection with organized crime.3 1 3 The
Perez Court sustained the Act as applied to petitioner on the ground
that even if the particular incident of activity was local, the larger
31 4
class of organized crime affected interstate commerce.
The apparent difficulty, as Justice Stewart noted in dissent, is
that the nature of organized crime is no different from crimes that are
the subject of state criminal laws in general.3 1 5 As a result, Stewart
claimed, sustaining the law as applied to petitioner's activities
threatened to confer the equivalent of state police powers upon
Congress.3 1 6 In one sense, this critique of Perez finds support in the
recent holdings in Lopez and Morrison, both of which curtailed
Congress's Commerce Clause power in areas that overlapped with
state criminal laws. These recent precedents, therefore, might be read
to cut back at the edges of Perez.
There is, however, a plausible theory under which the statute
at issue in Perez is justified under a coordination analysis in a manner
that these more recent cases are not. Extortionate credit practices in
many parts of the United States are connected with organized
criminal activity that crosses state lines. Organized crime in New
York extends to, or is at least connected with, organized crime in
Connecticut and New Jersey. The coordination problem involves state
and local prosecutors who might resist information sharing and other
forms of cooperation that could result in successful convictions in high
profile cases against criminals whose harmful activity was
experienced locally.
Referring once again to the prisoners' dilemma presented in
Table 1,317 from the perspective of the fight against organized crime,
each individual state would receive a relatively high payoff by
cooperating with the other state. And yet, from the perspective of each
individual state, which wants credit for high profile convictions, the
ideal solution is to enjoy the benefits of the other state's cooperation
312. Id. at 147 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1964 ed., Supp. V)).
313. Id.
314. See id. at 154 ("where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the
reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual instances of the
class." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
315. See id. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("In order to sustain this law we would, in my
view, have to be able to say that Congress could rationally have concluded that loan sharking is
an activity with interstate attributes that distinguish it in some substantial respect from other
local crime.").
316. See id. at 158 ('The definition and prosecution of local, intrastate crime are reserved to
the States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.").
317. See supra Table 1 at p.134.
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while jealously guarding information gathered in the course of the
underlying criminal investigation. Because it is rational for each state
to defect from a cooperative strategy without regard to what the other
state does, the result is mutual defection, depicted in the lower right
box, even though each state would receive higher payoffs with mutual
cooperation.
By raising the criminal enforcement action to the federal level,
the Consumer Credit Protection Act effectively forces the states to
share information. As a result, this act generates the equivalent of
mutual cooperation, even though the ultimate enforcement authority
will be federal, rather than state, prosecutors. This game simply has
no counterpart on the facts of either Lopez or Morrison. Isolated street
crimes that take place at or near schools, or random acts of violence
against women, do not create the sort of coordinated law enforcement
problem associated with information sharing that is at least
potentially relevant in the context of organized crime. As stated
previously, given the overlap with traditional state police powers,
Perez remains a difficult case. At a minimum, there is a plausible
coordination rationale for distinguishing Perez from the recent cases
retrenching on Congress's Commerce Clause powers. We are now
ready to return to Gonzales v. Raich.
b. Raich Revisited
The preceding analysis developed four paradigmatic cases from
two game theoretical models, which demonstrate the circumstances
under which central coordinated authority is needed to implement a
selected policy. Congressional regulatory intervention does not require
proof that structural coordination problems of the sort described in
Part II would actually emerge if the states were left to regulate the
matter on their own. Such an exacting standard would be impossible
to maintain. When the structural markers for a coordination difficulty
are identified, the burden should fall upon those seeking to limit
congressional power, not the other way around. Recall that the test to
assess the proper exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power is
rational basis.3 1 8 Provided there is a rational basis for presuming the
particular problem to require a central coordinated solution, the
burden falls upon those who would challenge the selected federal
regime.

318. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005) ("Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect
price and market conditions.").
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It is easy to see that none of the coordination games previously
identified apply to Raich.319 Because none of the coordination games
provides a compelling justification for the Raich result, selecting any
particular game to focus on is to some extent arbitrary. Still the game
at issue in Wickard, involving supply side coordination as a means of
raising prices, is important if for no other reason than that the Raich
majority found the two cases strikingly similar. 320 To demonstrate
that they are actually quite dissimilar, let us consider what Congress
set out to achieve in the schedule I marijuana classification in the
CSA. The classification was intended to further two objectives, first to
ban illicit marijuana use, and second, to ensure that marijuana, which
like wheat is fungible, is not moved from legitimate to illicit
321
channels.
Defining these legislative goals precisely is important. If the
goal instead were defined as ensuring that no one uses marijuana,
even if permitted under state law and on advice of a physician to
relieve intense pain or other symptoms for which traditional
medications fail to provide relief, then an absolute ban would be
322
essential to furthering the scheme. But this is entirely circular.
Notice, for example, that in Wickard, the Court did not justify its
application of the ban to Filburn on the circular logic that the scheme
was intended to prevent violations of quotas even by particular local
farmers like Filburn. 323 Rather, Justice Jackson suggested that
319. The analysis that follows in the text considers the Wickard coordination game. We can
quickly rule out the remaining categories. The regulatory objective is not to improve working
conditions. See supra Part II.B. In addition, while we will consider the question of raising
marijuana prices, the goal is not to ensure a competitive marijuana market by breaking
marijuana trusts. See supra Part II.B. If anything, the decrease in supply from the marijuana
ban raises prices and thus encourages the illicit market. As explained in the text, however, the
goal is also not to cartelize marijuana pricing. Rather, it is to ban acquisition and use in the
illicit marijuana market. The preservation game is not relevant because the goal is to ban, rather
than to preserve, marijuana as an illicit substance other than for FDA approved research, and no
one to my knowledge has ever suggested that cannabis is in danger of extinction thus
threatening that limited use. See supra Part II.C. And there is no geographical coordination
problem since the purpose is actually to block the flow of marijuana in commerce altogether as
an illicit drug. See supra Part II.D.
320. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 19-20.
321. See id. at 12-13 ('The main objectives of the CSA were to conquer drug abuse and to
control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances. Congress was particularly
concerned with the need to prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels.").
322. This would raise two further problems. First, it is doubtful that this goal would require
centralized coordinated intervention. State B's decision to allow limited use of medical marijuana
would not interfere with State A's contrary decision to ban such use even with the advice of a
physician. Second, even if the goal were as defined in the text, it is doubtful that there is a
rational basis to support that objective.
323. For a case in which then-Associate Justice Rehnquist employed comparable circular
logic to a provision of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, which denied continued windfall
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imposing the burden on Filburn was somehow linked to furthering the
larger legislative scheme.
As shown in Part II, individual states would confront a
structural impediment to implementing coordinated output reduction
as a means of securing non-competitive prices. While a centrally
coordinated scheme is therefore justified in implementing this selected
policy, it is not sufficient. Adopting the scheme but failing to signal the
level at which it will be enforced will result in an erosion of the
scheme. Since home grown wheat accounted for twenty percent of the
variance in the market, Justice Jackson evaluated the impact of
declining to honor the government's selected penalty on others
similarly situated.
The policy of preventing illicit use and illicit diversion of
marijuana does not possess the sort of structural impediments to
decentralized implementation at issue in Wickard.324 Some states
might be skeptical concerning the benefits of marijuana as a
treatment for pain and nausea, while other states might take a more
liberal view. But one state's decision to implement a more liberal
scheme on this narrow policy in no sense prevents another state from
declining to do so.
There is undoubtedly a risk of some seepage from the protected
medical marijuana market to the illicit drug market. 325 But this only
underscores the analysis. Recall that the original Wickard formulation
demanded a "substantial economic effect" on commerce. 326 An effect
that is not both "substantial" and "economic" will not do. 3 27 The
benefits to one class of workers, while allowing them to other workers, see United States
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1980) ("[T]he plain language of §
231b(h) marks the beginning and end of our inquiry. There Congress determined that some of
those who in the past received full windfall benefits would not continue to do so.").
324. This is true unless we engage in the unrealistic assumption that the states were
somehow in the pocket of the illegal drug industry and thus motivated to thwart the ban by
transferring medical marijuana to illicit channels. Of course since states do not tax illegal drugs,
it is hard to see this as plausible.
325. Of course it is almost certain that there will be more seepage in the reverse direction,
namely marijuana reallocated from the recreational drug market to the market for persons who
want it, but cannot obtain it, for medical use. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 n.28 ("Raich has
personally participated in that [illegal marijuana] market, and Monson expresses a willingness
to do so in the future.").
326. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
327. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 64 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote:
But even assuming that States' controls allow some seepage of medical
marijuana into the illicit drug market, there is a multibillion-dollar interstate
market for marijuana ....It is difficult to see how this vast market could be
affected by diverted medical cannabis, let alone in a way that makes
regulating intrastate medical marijuana obviously essential to controlling the
interstate drug market.
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structural problem justifying central coordinated intervention in
cartel enforcement arises because the failure to implement that policy
at the federal level will have a substantial effect in thwarting the
policy and because the effect will result in a change in the resulting
economic conditions in a manner that affects interstate commerce.
Absent central implementation and enforcement, the cartel would
threaten to break down. In Raich, however, a contrary ruling allowing
those who are permitted under state law, with their physician's
prescription, to use medical marijuana would have no such effect.
Instead, the Court's ruling simply denied relief-at least by lawful
means-to two women seeking relief for their pain and suffering.
CONCLUSION

While this Article has criticized particular doctrinal
formulations and applications under the Commerce Clause, and in
particular the Lopez formulation of the non-economic activities test
and the application of that test in Raich, its larger purpose goes
beyond any particular case. The central goal has been to construct a
new methodology for assessing the Commerce Clause-one grounded
in the need for a central coordinating authority to implement the
selected policy that has a substantial affect on interstate commercethat can be practically applied in actual cases.
The Commerce Clause is important because as shown in such
cases as Katzenbach v. McClung, and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, absent a more specific delegation, Congress will naturally
gravitate toward the most open ended source of power to effectuate
normative objectives it deems important. At the same time, however,
our federal Constitution, unlike its state counterparts, does not rest on
a model of plenary or presumed powers. The normative framework
developed in this Article satisfies the admonition most compellingly
expressed by now retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor that the
Commerce Clause doctrine must ensure that Congress has the power
to "regulate more than nothing ... and less than everything." 328 A
methodology that meets these objectives should appeal not only to
those who study constitutional law, but also, and more importantly, to
the sitting members of the Roberts Court.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
328. Raich, 545 U.S. at 47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

